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INTRODUCTION
Scholars have recently begun to contemplate the prospect of “pervasive computing,” with data-processing capacity and cues to digital
data ubiquitously embedded in devices distributed throughout the
1
human environment. Pervasive computing still lies in the future, but
in the last half-decade we have begun to experience the reality of per2
vasive image capture.
As digital technology proliferates in camera phones, iPhones, and
PDAs, almost any image we observe can be costlessly recorded, freely
reproduced, and instantly transmitted worldwide. We live, relate, work,
and decide in a world where image capture from life is routine, and
captured images are part of ongoing discourse, both public and private.
Capture of images has become an adjunct to memory and an accepted
medium of connection and correspondence. Digitally captured memories, in turn, precipitate conflicts between governmental authority and
free expression.
In the aftermath of the Iranian election during the summer of
2009, authorities sought to impede reporting on efforts to suppress
opposition demonstrators. Yet cell phone videos disseminated over
social-networking sites illuminated both official abuse and the scope
of civil resistance. The most striking images, depicting the shooting
death of Neda Agha-Soltan, were captured by nearby owners of cell
phone cameras, e-mailed to a series of correspondents outside the
country, posted on Facebook and YouTube, and then broadcast by
3
conventional media the same day. In the United States, amid arrests
of inconvenient photographers at the 2009 G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, images of efforts to suppress demonstrations documented on
4
amateur digital video followed a similar route to public cognizance.
1

E.g., Jerry Kang & Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93 (2005).
2
I borrow the felicitous phrase “pervasive image capture” from a proposal written
for the PICS workshop at UbiComp 2005, the Seventh International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing. Mirjana Spasojevic et al., Pervasive Image Capture and Sharing:
New Social Practices and Implications for Technology (2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.spasojevic.org/pics/PICS/UbicompCamphoneFinal.pdf. For the
purposes of this Article, captured “images” can be either visual or aural: the analysis applies to recordings in digital media of humanly perceivable sensory inputs.
3
See Brian Stelter & Brad Stone, In a Death Seen Around the World, a Symbol of Iranian Protests: Web Pries Lid of Censorship a Bit, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A1.
4
See, e.g., Don Babwin, Chicago Police Probed for Posing with Suspect, SOUTHTOWN
STAR (Chicago), Oct. 17, 2009, at A28, available at 2009 WLNR 21936697 (“The Chicago
Police Department . . . began investigating the Pittsburgh claims [of police misconduct]
after video of the alleged incident was posted on YouTube.”); Marty Levine, Image Prob-
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At the boundary between public and private, conservative activists
Hannah Giles and James O’Keefe impersonated a prostitute and a
procurer seeking aid from local offices of the Association of Community Organization for Reform Now (ACORN) and surreptitiously captured images of the resulting interactions. The videos, initially posted
on YouTube and a conservative website, rapidly spread to generate
5
mainstream political controversy. ACORN brought suit claiming that
the image capture constituted an invasion of privacy and a violation of
6
state wiretapping statutes.
A similar dynamic unfolds in more personal contexts. The phenomenon of “sexting,” in which owners of digital cameras capture
their own nude or revealing images and convey them by text message
or e-mail—with the accompanying danger of retransmission—has become increasingly prevalent with ubiquitous ownership of cell phone
7
cameras. Law enforcement authorities have taken alarm, and they
lem: Did Cops Target Cameras During G20?, PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER, Oct. 14–21, 2009, at
6 (describing arrests of photographers and independent media activists during G-20
demonstrations); Kurt Nimmo, Video from G20 the Corporate Media Will Never Show You,
INFOWARS (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.infowars.com/video-from-g20-the-corporatemedia-will-never-show-you (linking to YouTube videos showing the police advancing
on students in Pittsburgh).
5
See, e.g., Darryl Fears & Carol D. Leonnig, The $1,300 Mission to Fell ACORN: Duo in
Sting Video Say Their Effort Was Independent, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2009, at A1; Scott
Shane, A Political Gadfly Lampoons the Left via YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2009, at
A9; Howard Kurtz, Guerrilla Journalism, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2009, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092501130.html.
6
Complaint, ACORN v. O’Keefe, No. 90-6238 (Cir. Ct. Balt. City Sept. 23,
2009); see also Carol D. Leonnig, ACORN Sues over Damaging Video, WASH. POST, Sept.
24, 2009, at A4.
7
See KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS, THE MTV-ASSOCIATED PRESS POLL: DIGITAL ABUSE
SURVEY (2009), http://www.athinline.org/MTV-AP_Digital_Abuse_Study_Full.pdf; MTV
& THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, A THIN LINE: 2009 AP-MTV DIGITAL ABUSE STUDY (2009),
http://www.athinline.org/MTV-AP_Digital_Abuse_Study_Executive_Summary.pdf. Together, these reports indicate that of the 1247 respondents aged 14 to 24, 81% owned
cell phones with cameras. Additionally, 33% of respondents aged 18 to 24 and 24% of
the respondents aged 14 to 17 had sent or received a naked image by text message or email. Finally, 10% of the respondents had sent a naked image of themselves, and the majority of the images were transmitted to actual or potential romantic partners. See also
COX COMMUNICATIONS, TEEN ONLINE & WIRELESS SAFETY SURVEY: CYBERBULLYING,
SEXTING, AND PARENTAL CONTROLS 36, 41 (2009), http://www.cox.com/takecharge/
safe_teens_2009/media/2009_teen_survey_internet_and_wireless_safety.pdf (reporting
that 9% of thirteen-year-olds surveyed either sent or received sexually suggestive nude or
nearly nude digital images by text message or e-mail; that this figure rose to 24% of seventeen-year-olds; and that the vast majority of recipients were actual or potential romantic partners); THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN AND UNPLANNED PREGNANCY
& COSMOGIRL.COM, SEX AND TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG
ADULTS 1, 11-12 (2008), http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_
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have responded by invoking child pornography and obscenity statutes
8
to threaten prosecution of underage sexters.
These clashes between image capture and attempted suppression
are typical, but hardly exhaustive. In the next decade, the proliferation of digital visual capacity will regularly require legal decisionmakers to come to grips with the status of pervasive image capture
under the First Amendment. This Article commences the task.
I begin by parsing the technological trends that have set the stage
for pervasive image capture as a social practice and proceed to sketch
the emerging ecology of visual memory and discourse. I then canvass
legal developments that threaten to shadow the promise of the new
medium and discuss their proper analysis under the First Amendment. I argue against claims of earlier analysts that the process of recording images constitutes unprotected action. In today’s world, personal image capture is part of a medium of expression entitled to First
Amendment cognizance. I close with an initial account of the First
Amendment protections of pervasive image capture.
I. THE EMERGING TECHNOLOGY OF PERVASIVE IMAGE CAPTURE
Three developments converge to form the new reality of pervasive
image capture: digital photographic capability merges synergistically
with the ubiquity of the cell phone camera and the growth of online
venues for image sharing.
9
Digital cameras, introduced to the public in 1997, have driven the
marginal monetary cost of recording and saving images toward zero.
Summary.pdf (reporting that 20% of respondents aged 13 to 19 had sent or posted “a
nude or semi-nude picture[] or video” of themselves; that 31% had received such an
image; and that the vast majority of these images were sent to romantic partners).
8
See, e.g., State v. Canal, 773 N.W. 2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2009) (affirming obscenity
conviction for sexting); Nancy Rommelmann, Anatomy of a Child Pornographer, REASON,
July 2009, at 30-37 (discussing the growing trend of sexting prosecutions); Sexting in the
News, PC’S N DREAMS, http://www.pcsndreams.com/Pages/News.htm#Sexting (last
visited Oct. 15, 2010) (providing a news feed of sexting investigations and prosecutions). For a discussion of legislative and judicial action related to sexting, see also infra
notes 70-71.
Readers should be aware that I served on the counsel team representing teenage
girls along with their parents in a case in which the girls were threatened with child pornography prosecution for appearing in digital photographs from the waist up clad in
white opaque brassieres. The prosecution was preliminarily enjoined in Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 647 (M.D. Pa. 2009); the injunction was affirmed in Miller v.
Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010); a final injunction was entered by consent in
Miller v. Mitchell, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42512, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2010).
9
See Mark Halper, The Digital Camera Fights for Survival, TIME, Aug. 13, 2006,
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Freed of the expense of film, developing, and printing, a digital camera owner can capture almost any number of images without effective
monetary constraint. Once captured, digital images can be reproduced and disseminated like any other data; digital images flow fric10
tionlessly from cables to flash drives, to e-mail and web pages. Digital
cameras began to outnumber film cameras in the United States in
2003, and today more than two-thirds of Americans own digital cam11
eras. Similarly, video cameras, priced at $1500 in 1992, are available
in digital versions today for less than a tenth of that cost, and digital
image capture technology is increasingly available in a variety of inex12
pensive and ubiquitous personal digital devices.
13
Cell phone cameras, introduced in the United States in 2002,
have radically reduced the nonmonetary cost of image capture. In
modern life, cell phones constantly accompany their users. They combine effortless and immediately accessible digital photographic capa14
bility with the capacity to transmit captured images instantaneously.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1226058,00.html (“[D]igital cameras hit the mass market in 1997 . . . .”).
10
See PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCS. INT’L FOR THE PEW INTERNET &
AM. LIFE PROJECT, ANNUAL GADGETS SURVEY 2007, at 21 (2007), http://
www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Questionnaire/2009/PIAL%20Gadgets07%20
FINAL%20Topline_1213.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL GADGETS SURVEY 2007] (reporting
that 70% of respondents shared photos through e-mail and that 34% posted photos on
the Internet).
11
See id. at 15 (reporting that 62% of respondents owned digital cameras); Halper,
supra note 9 (reporting that digital cameras were adopted so universally that the market may have reached saturation); Digital Cameras—Whereto?, SOFTPEDIA (Mar. 21, 2005,
7:45 GMT), http://news.softpedia.com/news/Digital-cameras-whereto-709.shtml (noting that, in 2003, digital camera sales outnumbered those of classical cameras for the
first time and that digital camera sales have been increasing since).
12
See, e.g., Peter Gabriel et al., Moving Images: Witness and Human Rights Advocacy,
INNOVATIONS: TECHNOLOGY, GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION, Spring 2008, at 35, 50
(explaining how Witness, a human rights organization, is transforming because of the
availability and widespread adoption of recording tools and noting the drop in the
pricing of such technology); ANNUAL GADGETS SURVEY 2007, supra note 10, at 15 (reporting that 41% of respondents owned video cameras).
13
A Camera in Every Cellphone, AMERICANHERITAGE.COM, http://
www.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/it/2010/4/2010_4_18.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (“Sprint introduced the Sanyo SCP-5300, the first cellcam available
to American consumers, in December 2002.”).
14
See, e.g., AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, TEENS AND MOBILE PHONES OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS: PEW INTERNET LOOKS BACK 4 (2009),
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/PIP%20Teens%20and%
20Mobile%20Phones%20Data%20Memo.pdf (reporting that 77% of American adults,
and 71% of teenagers owned cell phones in 2008); ANNUAL GADGETS SURVEY 2007, supra note 10, at 16 (reporting that 58% of American cell phone owners use their phones
to take pictures).
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In modern America, cell phone ownership is on its way to becoming
15
universal, and virtually every cell phone has digital image capacity.
Finally, during the last five years, distribution channels for digitial
images have expanded exponentially. Social networking sites like Facebook, along with sites like Flickr, YouTube, and TwitPic, have combined
with increasingly usable blogging technology to enable any holder of an
16
image to make it instantly available to the world at large.
II. THE OPPORTUNITIES OF IMAGE CAPTURE: THE
DISCURSIVE ECOLOGY OF DIGITAL IMAGES
Pervasive image capture opens both personal and political opportunities; the capture of digital images is a part of an emerging ecology
of memory and discourse linking holders of cell phones, iPhones,
PDAs, and computers. At the personal level, the diffusion of imagecapture technologies provides channels to create life records, to connect with others, and to exercise creative capacities. In public discourse, pervasive image capture allows its users to hold public actors
accountable and to participate effectively in public dialogue.
A. Enrichment of Private Lives
Users of camera phones typically deploy the devices to enrich
their private lives. They augment their memories with captured im-

15

See, e.g., For Everyday Photography, Cell Phones Are Growing as Camera of Choice, BUSIWIRE, July 8, 2008 [hereinafter For Everyday Photography], available at Westlaw,
7/8/08 Bus. Wire 13:34:00 (“A whopping 96.3% of adult cell phone owners report that
they have a cell phone with a camera.”); Kristy Clairmont, PMA Data Watch: Camera
Phone Penetration Continues to Rise, PMA FORESIGHT (Mar. 15, 2010), http://
pmaforesight.com/?p=402 [hereinafter PMA Data Watch] (reporting that, in 2009, more
than 60% of households owned camera phones); AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SOCIAL MEDIA & MOBILE INTERNET USE AMONG TEENS
AND YOUNG ADULTS 4 (2010), http://pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2010/
PIP_Social_Media_and_Young_Adults_Report_final_with_toplines.pdf (“Three quarters
(75%) of teens and 93% of adults aged 18-29 now have a cell phone.”).
16
See FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?v=info&ref=pf (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (listing the founding date of Facebook as February 4, 2004);
FLICKR, http://blog.flickr.net/en/2004/02/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (discussing
the February 2004 launch of Flickr); TwitPic, TwitPic Company Profile, LINKEDIN,
http://linkedin.com/companies/twitpic (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (providing TwitPic founding date of 2008); YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (stating that YouTube was founded in February 2005); see also
Kristen Nicole, Twit Pic. It’s for Twitter Pictures, Of Course, MASHABLE, (Feb. 5, 2008),
http://mashable.com/2008/02/05/twit-pic (explaining that TwitPic allows users to
add images to their Twitter streams).
NESS
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ages. They strengthen personal bonds by sharing images with others.
They create works of visual authorship.
17
Visual memory is notoriously thin and unreliable. In response,
camera-phone users ubiquitously capture and archive images to
18
record their experiences for future reference. Regular and costless
image capture reinforces a sense that quotidian images are worthy of
19
retention and potential recall. And, in turn, the perceived worth of
the images encourages their further capture.
Modern life is increasingly atomized and centrifugal; pervasive
image capture allows users to build and nurture interpersonal connections. Camera-phone users capture images to share their lives with

17

Cf. Guys and Dolls, WIKIQUOTE, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Guys_and_Dolls
(last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (“SKY MASTERSON: However, if you are really looking for
some action, I will bet you the same thousand that you do not know the color of necktie you are currently wearing. (puts hand on top of Nathan’s tie) Well? NATHAN DETROIT: . . . No bet. (Sky removes his hand) Polka Dots! Only Nathan Detroit could blow
a bet on polka dots!”).
18
See Tim Kindberg et al., The Ubiquitous Camera: An In-Depth Study of Camera Phone
Use, IEEE PERVASIVE COMPUTING, Apr.–June 2005, at 42, 45 (reporting that 41% of images were captured for the purpose of “personal reflection or reminiscing”); Nancy A.
Van House & Marc Davis, The Social Life of Cameraphone Images 2 (2005) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the PICS workshop, UbiComp 2005), available at
http://www.spasojevic.org/pics/PICS/van_house_and_davis.pdf (“Images are used, to
preserve memories, but also to construct indiviidual [sic] and group narratives of oneself and one’s life.”); For Everyday Photography, supra note 15, at 2 (“46.4% of all adults
and 2/3 of adults age 18-30 say that they use their cell phone to snap selfportraits. . . . ‘Fifty-eight percent of adults age 18-30 tell us they use their camera
phones to document nightlife.’” (quoting Scott Abelman, Senior Vice President of
Marketing at Wirefly.com)); PMA Data Watch, supra note 15 (“Forty-three percent of
camera phone owners take pictures with the camera phone so they can have the picture with them at all times.”); see also Anna Reading, Memobilia: The Mobile Phone and the
Emergence of Wearable Memories (arguing that mobile phones contribute significantly to
digital memory), in SAVE AS . . . DIGITAL MEMORIES 81, 81-92 ( Joanne Garde-Hansen
et al. eds., 2009).
19
See, e.g., Okabe Daisuke & Mizuko Ito, Camera Phones Changing the Definition of
Picture-worthy, JAPAN MEDIA REV., Aug. 29, 2003, http://www.ojr.org/japan/wireless/
1062208524.php (describing the camera phone as an “intimate and ubiquitous presence that invites a new kind of personal awareness, a persistent alertness to the visually
newsworthy,” and noting that camera-phone users reported that they took photos
mostly of “‘things that they happened upon that were interesting,’” as well as, in decreasing amounts, family members, friends, themselves, pets, and travel (quoting a survey by IPSE Marketing)); see also GERARD GOGGIN, CELL PHONE CULTURE 145-47
(2006) (explaining that studies on the use of camera-phones share “a strong emphasis
on the embededness in an orientation of the camera phone towards a technology of
everyday life”); JOSÉ VAN DIJCK, MEDIATED MEMORIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 113 (2007)
(“Since the 1990s . . . cameras increasingly serve as tools for mediating quotidian experiences other than rituals or ceremonial moments.”).
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20

friends and family.
Particular shared images convey information,
perceptions, stories, or emotions; the stream of shared images estab21
lishes a sense of “co-presence” in correspondents’ lives.
Pervasive image capture provides the raw material of visual aes22
thetic works. The increasingly broad availability of costless image
capture and storage enables every owner of a cell phone or PDA to
practice the craft of the photographer or the filmmaker. With the
emergence of Photoshop and its relatives, art previously confined to
the darkroom and the studio is open to all members of the digerati;
anyone with an iPhone can achieve visual expression that a decade
23
ago was confined to cinematographers. This efflorescence of photographic and videographic expression enriches the lives of practitioners at least as much as it enlivens those of viewers.

20

See, e.g., Kindberg et al., supra note 18, at 45 (reporting that 35% of images are
“intended to enrich a shared experience,” and 21% are intended for communication to
absent family and friends); For Everyday Photography, supra note 15 (stating that 38.6% of
camera-phone photos are sent to friends and adding that 13.9% of adults and 28.1% of
respondents aged 18 to 30 report having sent a “flirtatious, suggestive, or nude photo”).
21
See, e.g., Tim Kindberg et al., I Saw This and Thought of You: Some Social Uses of
Camera Phones, in CHI ’05 EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYSTEMS 1545, 1546 (2005), available at http://portal.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?id=
1056962&type=pdf&CFID=116614411&CFTOKEN=54905948; Kindberg et al., supra
note 18, at 46; Nancy A. Van House, Flickr and Public Image-Sharing: Distant Closeness and
Photo Exhibition, in CHI ‘07 EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYSTEMS 2717, 2718-20 (2007), available at http://portal.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?id=
1241068&type=pdf&CFID=116614411&CFTOKEN=54905948; Amy Voida & Elizabeth
D. Mynatt, Six Themes of the Communicative Appropriation of Photographic Images, in CHI
2005: CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 171, 171 (2005); Mizuko Ito, Intimate Visual Co-Presence 1 (2005) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the PICS Workshop, UbiComp 2005), available at
http://www.spasojevic.org/pics/PICS/ito.ubicomp05.pdf; Van House, supra note 18,
at 2; Nancy A. Van House, Distant Closeness: Cameraphones and Public Image Sharing (2006) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the PICS Workshop, UbiComp
2006, the Eighth International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.114.8102&rep=rep1&type=
pdf; see also VAN DIJCK, supra note 19, at 112-18 (reporting the evolution among younger users of digital photography “from memory tools to communication devices, and
from sharing (memory) objects to sharing experiences”).
22
See, e.g., For Everyday Photography, supra note 15, at 2 (stating that 45.4% of photos taken on a cell phone are used as wallpaper design for the phone’s home screen).
23
See, e.g., Frank Beacham, The Impact of Mobile Technology, TV TECH. (July 20, 2009),
http://www.tvtechnology.com/article/84134 (“The new iPhone 3GS . . . democratizes
video . . . . [A]nyone with about $300 in their pocket [can] become a TV producer with a
potential global market.”).
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B. Public Discourse and Accountability
Pervasive image capture enhances public discourse. Premeditated
efforts to record publicly relevant occurrences are bolstered by the
continual accretion of images from spontaneous image capture. Images, unlike words, do not demand great literary ability, or even literacy, for persuasiveness; they provide apparently robust verification that
does not depend on the reputation of the proponent. In the emerging digital environment, broadly available and marginally costless image capture provides potential access to public dialogue for individuals and groups without firm economic or political bases or established
public credibility. Image capture therefore has the virtue, like leafleting and house signs, of providing “an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication . . . [e]specially for persons of modest
24
means or limited mobility.” The last decade has seen increasingly
important use of both targeted and spontaneous image capture as
foundations for public discourse.
1. Premeditated Image Capture
Images captured by chroniclers of public dramas lend impact and
immediacy to public discourse. Political activists increasingly substan25
tiate and dramatize claims with videos. Political campaigns accumulate public records of opponents’ statements by instructing campaign
26
workers to capture images of the opponent on the campaign trail. In
24

City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994). The Court in City of Ladue held that
a city’s “ban on almost all residential signs violate[d] the First Amendment.” Id. at 58; see
also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (upholding the right to distribute
leaflets door-to-door as “essential to the poorly financed causes of little people”).
25
See, e.g., THOMAS HARDING, THE VIDEO ACTIVIST HANDBOOK 69-73 (2d ed. 2001)
(citing examples of videos used to support a claim of wrongdoing); Roumen Dimitrov,
Acting Strategically: Skilled Communication by Australian Refugee Advocacy Groups, GLOBAL
MEDIA J.—AUSTRALIAN EDITION, no. 2, 2008, http://www.commarts.uws.edu.au/
gmjau/iss2_2008/pdf/GMJ%20Roumen%20Dimitrov%20v2_1%202008.pdf (observing
that “resource-poor groups . . . too weak to elevate . . . their problems to a higher level
of significance” used video advocacy to gain access to the public arena); Getting Burmese Atrocities on Camera (National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6602518 (detailing human
rights activists’ use of video cameras in Burma to document government atrocities).
26
In one striking example, the 2008 senatorial campaign of Jim Webb captured
images of Webb’s opponent, Senator George Allen, denigrating Webb’s photographer,
S.R. Sidarth, with the racist epithet “macaca.” The incident was then disseminated on
YouTube, Zkman, George Allen Introduces Macaca (Aug. 15, 2006), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=r90z0PMnKwI, and later picked up by other media. Allen’s campaign crumbled. See Tim Craig, The ‘What If’ of Allen Haunts the GOP Race,
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2008, at B1.
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smaller gatherings, citizen journalists capture words of politicians that
27
are difficult to disavow to a broader public. Recorded interactions at
public meetings establish a shared basis of knowledge for public dis28
cussion and critique.
Image capture can document activities that are proper subjects of
public deliberation but which the protagonists would prefer to keep
hidden and deniable. Animal rights activists regularly seek to record
29
and publicize what they regard as graphic examples of animal abuse.
Conservative activists seek to capture and publish images of their opponents engaged in activities that the activists believe the public would
30
oppose. Human rights campaigners document violations of humani31
tarian norms. News organizations place dubious police tactics on the
32
public record.
27

See, e.g., ERIC BOEHLERT, BLOGGERS ON THE BUS 166-71 (2009) (describing
campaign donor Mayhill Fowler’s recording of then-Senator Barack Obama’s comments about “bitter” Pennsylvanians delivered in a 2008 fundraising meeting in San
Francisco and the subsequent publishing of the recording on Huffington Post).
28
See, e.g., Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120, 121 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
(protecting a fathers’ rights group’s interest in filming public meetings of a rules committee); Iacobucci v. Boulter, No. 94-10531, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7010, at *19-20 (D.
Mass. Mar. 26, 1997) (protecting an independent reporter’s videotaping of a public
meeting of the town historical commission); Thompson v. City of Clio, 765 F. Supp. 1066,
1070 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (holding that proscription of the tape recording of a city council
meeting “regulates conduct protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment”); Tarus v. Borough
of Pine Hill, 916 A.2d 1036, 1039 (N.J. 2007) (holding that a municipal “watchdog” had
the right to videotape a borough council meeting); Maurice River Twp. Bd. of Educ. v.
Maurice River Twp. Teachers Ass’n, 475 A.2d 59, 61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984)
(holding that a teachers’ union was entitled to videotape school board meetings); Csorny
v. Shoreham-Wading River Cent. Sch. Dist., 759 N.Y.S.2d 513, 519 (App. Div. 2003) (protecting the right of parents to videotape a school-board meeting).
29
See, e.g., S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cnty., 499 F.3d 553, 561-62
(6th Cir. 2007) (discussing the lawfulness of a recording taken in a public park during
a deer-culling operation); Cuviello v. City of Stockton, No. 07-1625, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4896, at *76-79 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009) (enforcing an injunction to allow a
group to record alleged animal abuse by a circus); Cuviello v. City of Oakland, No. 065517, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59833, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (granting a preliminary injunction to allow an organization to film animal abuse by a circus from public property); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895
P.2d 1269, 1280 (Nev. 1995) (reviewing the videotaping of an entertainer disciplining
orangutans backstage).
30
E.g., Erica Noonan, Activist Seeks Cash for Case, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 18, 2001, at W1
(describing a conservative activist who recorded segments of an AIDS-prevention workshop sponsored by the Gay and Lesbian Student Education Network and provided the
recordings to local talk radio).
31
See, e.g., Gabriel et al., supra note 12, at 35-36 (describing the work of Witness.org, which since 1992 has provided video technology and training to human
rights activists who document human rights abuses for use in legal action, advocacy,
and organizing); Sam Gregory, Transnational Storytelling: Human Rights, WITNESS, and
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It is increasingly common for participants in situations of conflict
to deploy image capture techniques. Law enforcement officials regularly record images to document criminal violations. Recorded surveillance evidence is typical of many modern prosecutions involving
“stings,” but police officials have begun to record unscripted interac33
tions as well. Conversely, some criminal defendants have relied on
34
their own electronic recordings to impeach police accusations, while
others have introduced their video recordings of public conduct to
rebut claims that they had violated laws or to substantiate misconduct
35
by police officials.
Video Advocacy, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 195, 202-04 (2006) (exploring video use for
local, national, and transnational human rights audiences).
32
See, e.g., Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting tort claims against a news media team for filming undercover officers in connection with an alleged incident of sexual assault); Hornberger v. ABC, Inc., 799 A.2d
566, 571 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (dismissing action against ABC news crews
filming traffic stops of African American “testers” to investigate racial profiling on the
New Jersey Turnpike); cf. Cassidy v. ABC, Inc., 377 N.E.2d 126, 131-32 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978) (holding that a journalist who surreptitiously videotaped an undercover officer
in a massage parlor during an arrest of a parlor employee did not violate the officer’s
right of privacy where the officer was “discharging a public duty”).
For a somewhat more aggressive sting by an activist who distributed the record on
the Internet, see Doug Carman, OPD May Investigate Postings, ODESSA AM., Dec. 31,
2008, at 1A, which describes a police raid of a residence that officers had been led to
believe was a marijuana grow house: “when they entered the home they instead found
Christmas trees under grow lights and a poster telling them they were being
filmed . . . for a reality TV show.” See also The KopBusters Story, KOPBUSTERS.COM,
http://www.nevergetbusted.com/kopbusters/about.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2010)
(describing the use of video to expose illegal police raids on marijuana grow rooms).
33
See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 391 n.3 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing evidence based upon video captured by a dash-mounted video camera activated by police during an effort to apprehend a speeding car); Sharon Noguchi, San
Jose Police Test Head-Mounted Cameras for Officers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 18,
2009, available at LEXIS (describing a “pilot project equipping officers with headmounted cameras to document contacts with civilians”); David A. Harris, Picture This:
Body Worn Video Devices (“Head Cams”) as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance
by Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 4-8), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596901 (describing police experiences with dashboard cameras and “head cams”).
34
See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, A Switch Is Flipped, and Justice Listens In, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2007, at B1 (reporting that a defendant recorded a conversation with a police officer
and later used the recording in court); Jeanne Meserve & Mike Ahlers, Passenger Says
TSA Agents Harassed Him, CNN.COM, June 20, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/
2009/US/06/20/tsa.lawsuit/index.html#cnnSTCText (reporting that a passenger
used an iPhone to record an interaction with TSA agents, resulting in a disciplinary
action against one agent as well as a lawsuit against Homeland Security Secretary
Janet Napolitano).
35
See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, One Protest, 52 Arrests and a $2 Million Payout, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2008, at B1 (reporting on a video which showed that arrested protestors had

KREIMER FINAL REVISED 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Pervasive Image Capture

1/11/2011 2:31 PM

347

Captured images need not be conveyed to others to have a salutary
effect. Just as public surveillance cameras are said to reduce crime, the
prospect of private image capture provides a deterrent to official actions
36
that would evoke liability or condemnation. Images allow victims to
37
claim their voice and to leverage widely held norms to shame violators.
2. Ambient Image Capture
As image-capture capability has diffused, publicly salient images
emerge not only from premeditated efforts to prepare for public dialogue, but from recordings by serendipitous amateur photographers.
The iconic videotapes of the beating of Rodney King in 1991 were
recorded by a plumbing shop manager, George Holliday, who was
not, in fact, blocked pedestrians as charged); Jim Dwyer, Videos Challenge Hundreds of
Convention Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2005, at A1 (discussing the use of video to rebut
allegations of resisting arrest and impeach claims of officers that defendants engaged
in misconduct); cf. Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 156-57 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (reviewing an action against a police officer who seized the film of and arrested
a participant who had been photographing undercover officers at a demonstration);
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (sustaining the claim of the
plaintiff who videotaped police at a demonstration and overturning summary judgment below); Campbell Clark et al., Sûreté du Québec to Review Practices, GLOBE & MAIL
(TORONTO), Aug. 25, 2007, at A5, available at 2007 WLNR 16583215 (reporting that
video recorded by demonstrators showed identifiable police agents acting as provocateurs seeking to instigate violence and resistance among demonstrators). Footage of
the Quebec protest is available at CanadiansNanaimo, Stop SPP Protest-Union Leader
Stops Provocateurs (Aug. 20, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=St1-WTc1kow.
36
See, e.g., HARDING, supra note 25, at 65-67 (describing examples of video “pacifying” potential conflicts with officials); Gabriel et al., supra note 12, at 44 (describing
“[v]ideo filming as a deterrent to further abuse”); Karen Auge, Images Capture Big Show:
Protesters, Celebrity Fans and the Curious Are Taking Videos and Pictures Outside the DNC,
DENVER POST, Aug. 28, 2008, at P-17, available at 2008 WLNR 16257906 (“CopWatch
has been trailing Denver police for years, videotaping confrontations with large
groups . . . . [D]emonstrators . . . have made sure that cameras are rolling as they
traipse through Denver streets.” (citing Steve Nash, founder of CopWatch)); Residents
Given Video Cameras to Monitor Cops, MSNBC.COM, June 20, 2007, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19340005/ (reporting that the ACLU distributed video cameras to residents of “high-crime neighborhoods” to help monitor police conduct).
The tactic of using cameras to defend against abuses by officials is not new. See
Charles E. Jones, The Political Repression of the Black Panther Party 1966–1971: The Case of
the Oakland Bay Area, 18 J. BLACK STUD. 415, 417 (1988) (reporting on the “Panther
Police Patrol,” which deployed tape recorders and cameras to document police stops),
cited in Regina Austin, The Next “New Wave”: Law-Genre Documentaries, Lawyering in Support of the Creative Process, and Visual Legal Advocacy, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J., 809, 865 n.166 (2006).
37
See HOLLABACK!, http://www.ihollaback.org/about (last visited Oct. 15, 2010)
(featuring photos and stories about “street harassers” in an effort to empower women
and people who identify as LGBTQ to “holla back” at men who sexually harass them in
public areas).
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38

awakened by noise outside of his window. Holliday captured the unfolding arrest and beating on a video camera he had bought a month
39
before to record friends and family. After his attempts to share the
tape with the Los Angeles police department were rebuffed, he submitted the tape to a local television station that aired a segment and
40
offered it to CNN for syndication.
Today, cell phones provide constant and costless opportunities to
capture images—opportunities that generate a burgeoning social
41
practice of recording images from daily life. The resulting records
provide an underpinning of corroboration and salience to events that
otherwise might have been briefly observed ephemera.
In the 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2005 London Tube bombings,
cell phone videos were uploaded to publicly available websites and ra42
pidly emerged as the foundation of public deliberation. Digital pictures of the abuses at Abu Ghraib recorded by American service
members documenting their daily lives catalyzed both internal inves38

See John Carman, The Story Behind the King Videotape, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May
10, 1992, at 3A, available at 1992 WLNR 2056138 (chronicling the origins of the Rodney King video).
39
Id.
40
Id.; see also Photographer of Inglewood Incident Arrested; Why Did Inglewood Officer Strike Handcuffed Teen?, CNN CONNIE CHUNG TONIGHT (CNN television broadcast
July 11, 2002), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0207/11/cct.00.html (quoting George Holliday explaining to the announcer, “I called the police department and
they pretty much hung up on me. I was even before [sic] I could mention I had a tape of
it. So then I called Channel 5.”).
The Sony Handycam was developed in 1985 and became widely available shortly
thereafter. See Ron Sanchez & D. Sudharshan, Real-Time Market Research, 11 MARKETING INTELLIGENCE & PLAN., no. 7, 1993, at 34-35; cf. Lambert v. Polk County, 723 F.
Supp. 128, 133 (S.D. Iowa 1989) (recognizing the First Amendment right of a videographer who videotaped a street fight and sought to sell the footage to news media).
Digital video began to emerge in the nonprofessional consumer market in 1995.
See David Brott, Product Probe, VIDEOMAKER, Nov. 1995, at 43.
41
See sources cited supra notes 18-19.
42
See, e.g., Anna Reading, Mobile Witnessing: Ethics and the Camera Phone in the “War
on Terror,” 6 GLOBALIZATIONS 61, 67-72 (2009) (discussing a widely circulated video of
the 2005 London Tube bombings taken by a nonjournalist on his mobile camera
phone); Matea Gold, Cellphones Change the View of Disaster, L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2005, at
A1 (providing numerous examples of amateur videos that captured the London Tube
bombings and were broadcast to large audiences by major news networks); Verne Kopytoff, Terror in London: The Day After, S.F. CHRON., July 9, 2005, at A9, available at 2005
WLNR 10757533 (noting the substantial increase in publicly available images of the
Asian tsunami and London Tube bombings due to the growing presence of cell phone
cameras in the hands of the average individual); Jo Twist, Mobiles Capture Blast Aftermath, BBC NEWS, July 8, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4663561.stm
(explaining that many of the initial images of the London Tube bombings—and some
of the most publicly recognized ones—were captured by cell phone cameras).
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43

tigations and public outrage. Spontaneously captured videos provided iconic images of September 11, 2001, the shootings at Virginia
44
Tech, and the death of Saddam Hussein.
Images of Iranian demonstrations and repression captured by
participants and onlookers evaded efforts of the Iranian government
to suppress media coverage in the aftermath of the 2009 election,
45
and digital networks continue to disseminate images of protests. In
the United States, barriers to news gathering are less often official,
but the decline in resources available to gather news in an industry
under pressure from online competition poses increasing challenges

43

See, e.g., PHILIP GOUREVITCH & ERROL MORRIS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCE178-79, 262-64 (2008) (describing Abu Ghraib digital photographic documentation, the submission of photographs to military investigators, and the subsequent effect
of that submission); Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow “War”: FOIA, the
Abuses of Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141,
1197-208 (2007) (analyzing the submission of Abu Ghraib photographs to U.S. military
investigators by Specialist Joseph Darby, the ensuing investigations, and the ultimate
catalytic disclosure of the abuses); Philip Gourevitch, Op-Ed., The Abu Ghraib We Cannot
See, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009, at WK10 (discussing the impact of photographs of Abu
Ghraib taken by American soldiers with digital cameras).
44
See, e.g., Judi Hetrick, Amateur Video Must Not Be Overlooked, MOVING IMAGE,
Spring 2006, at 66, 67 (explaining that an amateur video is the only visual record of
both planes hitting the World Trade Center on 9/11); May Wong, Camera Phone Technology Creates Cultural Impact, CHI. TRIB., May 28, 2007, § 3, at 5 (reporting that cell
phone users captured and made public video footage from the shooting at Virginia
Tech in 2007 and Saddam Hussein’s execution in 2006).
45
See, e.g., Editorial, Reporting Duty: Censoring the Foreign Media Hurts, and Diminishes Both Iran and Its People, TIMES (London), June 18, 2009, at 2 (commenting that average Iranians have turned to images and videos captured by cell phones and cameras to
find the “truth” of what is happening in their country because of the Iranian government’s ban on the international press); Christopher Rhoads, Activists Skirt Web Crackdown to Reach the Outside World, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2009, at A8 (explaining that despite
crackdown on Iran’s opposition movement, people were still posting videos and other
media online); Brian Stelter, News Media Relax Their Rules to Cope with Media Ban in Iran,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 30, 2009, at 21, available at 2009 WLNR 12415098 (“In a
news vacuum, amateur videos and eyewitness accounts became the de facto source for
information.”); Iran Bans International Journalists from Covering Rallies, CNN.COM, June
16, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/16/iran.journalists.banned
(describing the Iranian government’s ban of the international media from reporting
on opposition rallies protesting the controversial presidential election results); Dave
Siavashi, Live-blog: Ashura in Iran-—December 27, 2009, IRAN NEWS NOW (Dec. 26, 2009),
http://www.irannewsnow.com/2009/12/live-blog-ashura (documenting the clashes
between Iranian police and protestors on December 27, 2009, through live reporting,
video feeds, and photographs); Brett Soloman, Ready Set Revolution, CITIZENTUBE
(Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.citizentube.com/2009/12/ready-set-revolution.html
(documenting the distribution of citizen videos from Iran to social media sites and
news organizations).
DURE
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46

to the viability of informed public discussion. Serendipitous amateur image capture can fill some of the lacunae left by the decima47
tion of salaried news staffs.
Officials have introduced spontaneously captured images in pub48
lic prosecutions. Conversely, police abuse captured by the cameras
of bystanding videographers, followed by public broadcast of the footage, has become a regular feature of our public life and the under49
pinning of effective demands for redress. Spontaneously captured
46

Cf. Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 272-73 (4th Cir. 2009) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (arguing that First Amendment jurisprudence should be sensitive to the evolving
state of journalism, as “[t]he verdict is still out on whether the Internet and the online
ventures of traditional journalistic enterprises can help fill the void left by less comprehensive print and network coverage of public business”).
47
Cf. Paul Harris, The King of Online Gossip Who Became the Scourge of Hollywood, OBSERVER (London), Oct. 25, 2009, at 33, available at LEXIS (describing a celebrity news
site “full of vidoes [sic], taking advantage of its staff, freelancers, tourists and just about
anyone with a camera phone who happens to spot a famous face”); CNN IREPORT,
http://ireport.cnn.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (encouraging the CNN audience to
submit photographs and video on a variety of issues); YOUTUBE DIRECT, http://
www.youtube.com/direct (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (making software available to allow
news organizations to solicit and edit videos from members of the general public).
48
See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, Three Men Who Had No Reason to Run, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2008, at B1 (reporting that a recording by a “freelance videographer” was introduced
at trial by prosecutors to support their case of police abuse); John Lauinger, Cops Nail
Subway Pervert, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 14, 2009, at 14, available at 2009 WLNR 15866932
(detailing the arrest of a suspect after a woman who had been subjected to indecent
exposure on a New York City subway captured an image of the man on her cell phone
and provided it to police); Doug Page, Dayton Woman Wanted in Attack with Stiletto Heel,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 27, 2010, at A5, available at 2010 WLNR 14946577 (chronicling the account of a victim attacked by a woman with a stiletto heel and noting that an
iPhone video of the incident helped police apprehend the suspect); Stewart M. Powell,
Moussaoui Jury Hears Graphic 9/11 Details, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 7, 2006, at A3, available
at 2006 WLNR 5901371 (describing prosecution’s presentation of testimony of a “visitor from Washington state, Tamar Rosbrook, who narrated a video that she and her
husband took of the World Trade Center from their hotel room that showed dozens of
victims falling toward the ground”).
49
See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, When Official Truth Collides with Cheap Digital Technology, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2008, at B1 (describing a YouTube video shot by a tourist that contradicts a police officer’s account of why he shoved a cyclist off his bicycle); John Eligon &
Colin Moynihan, Police Officer Seen on Tape Shoving a Bicyclist Is Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
16, 2008, at A33 (reporting on the indictment and on a community group’s demands
that police use less aggressive tactics against bicyclists accused of creating public safety
hazards); Raj Jayadev, Op-Ed., Much Harder to “Spin” Violence in Web 2.0 Era, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2009, at 9A, available at 2009 WLNR 627686 (discussing the
impact of cell phone videos posted on YouTube and aired by local news organizations
that show a young man being shot to death by a police officer); Meg Coyle, FBI
Launches Civil Rights Probe into Seattle PD Video, KING5.COM, May 10, 2010, http:
//www.king5.com/news/FBI-launches-civil-rights-investigation-into-Seattle-PD-video93336449.html (detailing the content of a video that shows several police officers phys-
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images from different sources can be combined to generate public information that could not have been gleaned by any single observer.
Thus, in the aftermath of the mass arrests at the 2004 Republican National Convention in New York City, an activist forensic video analyst
gathered and collated images of the demonstrations to reveal a robust
50
police practice of infiltrating political demonstrations, while investigators in London collated amateur videos to lay the basis for prosecut51
ing police abuse during demonstrations in April 2009.
III. PERCEIVED DANGERS AND REGULATORY REACTIONS:
DARK SIDES AND SHADOWS
The advent of pervasive image capture brings anxiety as well as
opportunity. Most Americans have never believed that photographs
will steal their souls, but innovations in the technology of image capture have historically generated a sense of vulnerability and discomfort. The introduction of the portable camera in the late nineteenth
century provoked unease, along with legal innovations that laid the
52
groundwork for the modern law of privacy. In the last decade and a
ically and verbally abusing a young man and that later ignited a civil rights investigation); Mayra Moreno, Teacher Fired After Beating Caught on Camera, 39ONLINE.COM, May
11, 2010, http://www.39online.com/news/local/kiah-charter-school-student-beatenstory,0,1079016.story (reporting on the dismissal of a teacher after she was recorded
on a cell phone camera beating up a student); Alex Veiga, YouTube.com Video Prompts
Probe of LAPD, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/200611-13-youtube-arrest_x.htm (reporting on the posting of a cell phone video on YouTube that led to an investigation of police brutality because it captured police officers
repeatedly punching a suspect as they arrested him).
50
See Jim Dwyer, New York Police Covertly Join In at Protest Rallies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22,
2005, at A1 (describing collection and collation of these images).
51
Amateur videos played a key role in exposing the police brutality that occurred
during the London G-20 Summit in April 2009. Jerome L. Sherman, Ubiquitous Cameras Capture Actions by Police, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 6, 2009, at A15, available
at 2009 WLNR 17488543. A New York hedge fund manager filmed an incident in
which a London police officer “struck . . . and pushed . . . to the ground” a newspaper
vendor, who died shortly thereafter from the trauma. Id.
The Guardian newspaper soon acquired the video, which contradicted police
statements about [the vendor’s] death. It pushed Britain’s Independent Police Complaints Commission to launch one of the largest investigations in the
commission’s history, relying heavily on video footage captured by people who
were on the streets of London on April 1 and 2.
Id.
52

See, e.g., Robert E. Mensel, “Kodakers Lying in Wait”: Amateur Photography and the
Right of Privacy in New York, 1885–1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 28-41 (1991) (describing the
spread of inexpensive cameras and widespread distribution of photographs which
made photography possible for “thousands upon thousands” of amateur photograph-
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half, pervasive image capture has begun to generate a similar sense of
dislocation and unease. This concern for a dark side of image capture
has precipitated legal theories, regulatory strategies, and enforcement
decisions—theories, strategies, and decisions that cast shadows on the
practice of image capture and threaten to cripple its promise.
A. Proposed Public Privacy Torts
The original proposal by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis for a
tort remedy to protect privacy was rooted in late nineteenth-century
53
concern over portable cameras and the emerging plebeian press.
Over the course of the last century, American common law developed
a portfolio of “privacy torts” that constrains the capture and dissemination of images. Mainstream common law precedent recognizes
both the tort of intrusion on seclusion and the tort of publication of
private facts. Neither applies directly to most digital image capture.
Intrusion on seclusion provides relief only against images involuntarily
captured within the target’s own home or in facilities remote from the
public; publication of private facts is generally held to be inapplicable
54
to images voluntarily exposed to the public gaze.
Emphasizing the extent of potential surveillance in public areas by
pervasive image capture and the harms that can attend Internetenabled distribution of embarrassing images, contemporary commentators have regularly advocated expanding the privacy tort to encompass nonconsensual image capture in public spaces. The arguments

ers, and exploring the consequent anxiety and “profound sense of exposure and violation” among potential unwilling subjects of photography, as well as subsequent legal
efforts to curb unbridled photography); see also The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
23, 1902, at 8 (discussing the dangers of “‘kodakers’ lying in wait,” the “ordeal of the
camera,” and the need for a remedy for “these savage and horrible practices”).
53
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890) (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops.’”). But see Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64
N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902) (refusing to enjoin publication of advertisements featuring
unauthorized photographs of the plaintiff because a principle that restrains “publication of that which purports to be a portrait of another person, even if obtained upon
the street by an impertinent individual with a camera . . . [would extend to a vast] list
of things that are spoken and done day by day which seriously offend the sensibilities
of good people”).
54
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (discussing the doctrine of intrusion upon seclusion); id. § 652D cmt. b (examining the doctrine of “publicity given to matters concerning private . . . life”).
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began with concern about handheld camcorders and flourished with
56
worries about cell phone cameras.
Most recently, commentators
have taken alarm at the emergence of Internet capabilities, arguing
for the necessity of providing “legal recourse in networked places
57
crawling with camera-toting citizen-journalists.”
These proposals have not yet begun to bear abundant fruit in case
law; most reported cases involve either private intrusions into intimate
situations or media defendants rather than citizen-journalists. Cases involving surreptitious capture of images in intimate situations have
58
found some success. But reported cases tend to run aground either
59
on the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy or on a news55

See e.g., Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory
of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1021-22 (1995).
56
E.g., Alan Kato Ku, Comment, Talk Is Cheap, But a Picture Is Worth a Thousand
Words: Privacy Rights in the Era of Camera Phone Technology, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 679
(2005); Aimee Jodoi Lum, Comment, Don’t Smile, Your Image Has Just Been Recorded on a
Camera-Phone: The Need for Privacy in the Public Sphere, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 377 (2005).
57
Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras and Computers: The First Amendment and Networked
Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 46 (2007); see also, e.g., Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting
Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5-7 (2007); Jacqueline D. Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV.
919, passim (2010); Josh Blackman, Student Article, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in
Public, and the Right to Your Digital Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual’s Image over the Internet, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313, 354-92 (2010).
58
See, e.g., Doe v. Luster, No. B184508, 2007 WL 2120855, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July
25, 2007) (determining that a cause of action existed for distribution of videos of alleged rapist committing multiple sexual assaults after drugging victims); In re Marriage
of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 830 (Iowa 2008) (finding that a husband who surreptitiously videotaped his wife in their marital bedroom violated the wife’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”); Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming a jury verdict against a man who secretly videotaped a series of consensual sexual
encounters with ex-girlfriends).
59
See, e.g., Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 815 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that, under Arizona law, a medical lab owner had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy when he met with ABC representatives who covertly
taped the encounter); Deteresa v. ABC, Inc., 121 F.3d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a woman videotaped “in public view from a public place” without her knowledge did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy); Hornberger v. ABC, Inc., 799
A.2d 566, 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (holding that police officers had no reasonable expectation of privacy to support their claims of violation of privacy under
New Jersey’s Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act when a reporter’s
hidden camera filmed the officers searching a car); cf. J.H. Desnick, M.D., Eye Servs.,
Ltd. v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1353 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that use of “test patients”
with concealed cameras did not violate employees’ privacy rights); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1281 (Nev. 1995)
(holding that a backstage video recording of an animal trainer did not violate a trainer’s privacy right because the recording did not interfere with the trainer’s expected
privacy). But cf. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 524 (4th Cir.
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60

worthiness defense. Still, with the continued spread of pervasive image
capture, efforts to impose common law liability are unlikely to abate.
B. Legislative Initiatives Directed at Image Capture
Legislative initiatives aimed at the perceived dangers of the
emerging digital visual ecology have been less restrained. California
has adopted several waves of antipaparazzi statutes attempting to limit
61
capture of celebrity images. Localities have banned the use of cell
phone cameras in public restrooms and have proposed prohibiting
62
the use of cell phone cameras near ATM sites.
The last decade and a half has brought the unpleasant phenomenon of “upskirt photography,” in which images of pudenda and undergarments are captured in public locations by means of aggressive
digital photography. These images, and others captured surreptitiously in a variety of venues, have come to be posted on a burgeon-

1999) (affirming judgment against employees for breach of loyalty when employees
used hidden cameras to film employer’s food handling practices); Turnbull v. Am.
Broad. Cos., No. 03-3554, 2004 WL 2924590, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2004) (sustaining cause of action for secretly filming a casting workshop); Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978
P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1999) (sustaining cause of action for invasion of privacy against a reporter for posing as a coworker and secretly recording conversations); Special Force
Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 792-95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (sustaining action for trespass and fraud against a television station after a station employee posed as a volunteer and secretly videotaped activities in the facility for use in a
news story).
60
See, e.g., Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007) (sustaining
newsworthiness defense of television station’s broadcast of videotape showing accused
rapist’s assault on unconscious victim); Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210,
1223-25 (10th Cir. 2007) (sustaining newsworthiness defense of broadcast of images of
undercover police officer accused of abuse); Lee v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., No. 96-7069,
1997 WL 33384309, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 1997) (sustaining newsworthiness defense
in publication of celebrities’ private honeymoon photographs). But see, e.g., Y.G. v.
Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 501 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that plaintiffs’ privacy interests outweighed station’s interest in publicizing newsworthy events
after plaintiffs were filmed at a gathering of in vitro fertilization participants).
61
See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1528 (2009) (describing the “constructive invasion of privacy” tort, which provides a remedy against the use of a “‘visual or auditory enhancing device’ . . . ‘regardless of whether there is a physical trespass’” (quoting CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1708.8(b) (West 2009))); see also Richardson-Tunnell v. Schs. Ins. Program
for Empls. (SIPE), 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176, 183 (Ct. App. 2007) (explaining the history
of § 1708.8).
62
Ku, supra note 56, at 691-92 (describing enacted and considered local bans on
cell phone cameras in certain public places).

KREIMER FINAL REVISED 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

1/11/2011 2:31 PM

Pervasive Image Capture

355

63

ing variety of pornographic websites.
In response, legislatures
around the country have promulgated statutes prohibiting “video
64
voyeurism.” An early initiative in Tennessee made it an offense
for a person to knowingly photograph, or cause to be photographed an
individual, when such individual is in a place where there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy, without the prior effective consent of the individual . . . if such photograph:
1) Would offend or embarrass an ordinary person if such person
appeared in the photograph; and
2) Was taken for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of
65
the defendant.

The federal version, adopted a decade later, applies in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States to punish an individual who has “the intent to capture an image of a private area of an
individual without their consent, and knowingly does so under circums66
tances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”
Many applications of these video voyeurism statutes have prosecuted
image capture that would be considered abusive under almost any stan67
dard. But the more broadly written statutes constrain the capture of

63

See, e.g., Clay Calvert & Justin Brown, Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the Internet:
Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 469, 499 (2000).
64
Early articles advocating such statutes include Calvert & Brown, id., Maria Pope,
Technology Arms Peeping Toms with a New and Dangerous Arsenal: A Compelling Need for
States to Adopt New Legislation, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1167 (1999), and
Lance E. Rothenberg, Student Article, Re-thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs,
and the Failure of Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public
Space, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1127 (2000).
65
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-605 (Supp. 2001).
66
18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006). For a recent survey of “video voyeurism” statutes, see
Timothy J. Horstmann, Comment, Protecting Traditional Privacy Rights in a Brave New Digital World: The Threat Posed by Cellular Phone-Cameras and What States Should Do to Stop It, 111
PENN ST. L. REV. 739, 739-41 (2007). See also Video Voyeurism Laws, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.ncvc.org/src/AGP.Net/Components/DocumentViewer/
Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=37716 (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (listing states with
“video voyeurism” statutes).
67
E.g., People v. Hobbs, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 687 (Ct. App. 2007) (“[D]efendant
snuck into the girls’ locker room . . . set up a video camera so he could film [unseen] . . . [and] filmed at least 45 girls who were competing in the swim meet as they
changed into and out of their bathing suits.”); State v. Schaller, 08-0522, p. 15-16 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 5/26/09); 15 So. 3d 1046, 1055-56 (defendant secretly videotaped the sexual acts between a teenage girl and her boyfriend); State v. Huffman, 165 Ohio App.
3d 518, 2006-Ohio-1106, 847 N.E.2d 58, at ¶¶ 1-6 (defendant installed a hidden camera in a tanning room).
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images that carry considerably more claim to protection, and aggressive
69
officials have been inclined to stretch the statutes even further.
The recent moral panic regarding sexting has produced similar results. Alarmed prosecutors have invoked child pornography and obscenity statutes to prosecute minors who capture or transmit nude or
70
provocative images of themselves. Legislators dissatisfied with existing
71
statutes have begun to draft statutes directed specifically at the practice.
Recent foreign legislation has targeted potentially harmful image
capture even more aggressively. New British criminal statutes could
be used to prohibit photographs of police officers that are “likely to
72
be useful” to terrorists. Confronted with the disturbing fad of “happy slapping,” in which assaults are perpetrated in order to capture and
distribute images of the attacks, French law now forbids “recording or

68

See, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 2000 WI 71, ¶¶ 21-22, 236 Wis. 2d 86, 613 N.W.2d 90
(invalidating a statute for overbreadth because it could apply to newsworthy images
and political satire); cf. State v. Reep, 167 P.3d 1156, 1157-58 (Wash. 2007) (considering prosecution for images of children sitting on trampolines taken from the defendant’s bedroom window).
69
See, e.g., Griesinger v. Loveland City Sch. Dist., No. 06-0569, 2007 WL 433298, at
*1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2007) (recounting a prosecution for voyeurism when plaintiff
complained about the inappropriate attire of a high school dance-team manager and
e-mailed three still pictures from a videotape of a dance team performance to responsible school administrators); Allen Gwinn, Photographer Arrest Tossed; D.A. Apologizes For
Southlake Police Behavior, DALLAS.ORG, Nov. 1, 2005, http://www.dallas.org/node/97
(reporting the improper arrest of a photographer for taking pictures at Oktoberfest);
Darius Radzius, Man Arrested for Unlawful Photography, TRICITIES.COM, July 12, 2008,
http://www.tricities.com/news/2008/jul/12/man_arrested_for_unlawful_photograph
y-ar-254606 (reporting the arrest for “unlawful photography” of a citizen who took a
picture of a police officer during a traffic stop).
70
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of sexting); see
also, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So.2d 234, 235-36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming the
adjudication of delinquency for child pornography of a sixteen-year-old girl who had
taken 117 digital photos of herself and her seventeen-year-old boyfriend “naked and
engaged in sexual behavior” and e-mailed the images to her home computer); State v.
A.R.S., 684 So.2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam) (reversing the
dismissal of child pornography charges against a fifteen-year-old boy who videotaped
himself and a younger female “engaged in nude, sexual foreplay” and then played the
tape for a friend); State v. D.H., 9 P.3d 253, 254 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding the
“sexual exploitation of a minor” conviction of a fifteen-year-old boy who brought a video camera to high school and persuaded three of his fifteen-year-old classmates to expose their breasts for the camera).
71
See 2009 “Sexting” Legislation: Year-end Summary, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS
(revised Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17756 (listing states that
introduced “sexting” legislation in 2009 and discusing the goals of these statutes).
72
See Olivier Laurent, Jail for Photographing Police?, BRIT. J. PHOTOGRAPHY, Jan. 28,
2009, at 4 (describing the increased police power to prevent photography under the
Counter-Terrorism Act of 2008).
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distributing images of violent crime” by individuals who are not pro73
fessional journalists.
C. Wiretapping Statutes, Open-Textured Prohibitions, and Official Fiat
Police, like many civilians, are often camera-shy. Officers dislike
being recorded in embarrassing situations and may be concerned that
74
dissemination of their images may put them at risk of retaliation.
They are accustomed, as well, to substantial deference in the construc75
tion of official narratives, and many would prefer to be in a position
to shape perceptions of their actions without competing digital
records. Police officers often view private digital image capture as a
challenge to their authority.
As a result, the spread of pervasive image capture in the last decade has been accompanied by a rich set of cases in which police have
sought to prosecute critics or potential critics who capture their images. In these cases, police officers and other officials have enlisted
both existing statutes and creative prosecutorial discretion in the
struggle to constrain inconvenient image capture.

73

Adam Sage, Happy-Slapping Film Ban ‘Will Gag Citizen Journalists,’ TIMES (London),
Mar. 9, 2007, at 43 (quoting the French law) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Peter Sayer, France Bans Citizen Journalists from Reporting Violence, MACWORLD (Mar. 6, 2007,
3:00 AM), http://www.macworld.com/article/56615/2007/03/franceban.html (“The law
could lead to the imprisonment of eyewitnesses who film acts of police violence, or operators of web sites publishing the images . . . .”); New Prevention of Criminality Law Poses
Threat to Citizen Reporting, REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Mar. 8, 2007), http://en.
rsf.org/IMG/article_PDF/france-new-prevention-of-criminality-law-08-03-2007,21237.pdf
(reporting the potential implications of the ban).
74
Cf. Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2007) (remarking on “the difficult and potentially dangerous situation undercover officers face after
having their identities revealed to the public”); Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158
(11th Cir. 1995) (observing that photographs could be useful in carrying out death
threats against officers and that “criminal organizations prize photographs of undercover officers”).
75
E.g., CITY OF NEW YORK COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, COMM’N REPORT 36 (1994), available at http://www.parc.info/client_files/special%20Reports/
4%20-%20Mollen%20Commission%20-%20NYPD.pdf (identifying incidence of police
perjury in New York sufficiently common to coin the broadly current neologism “testilying”). For other discussion of “testilying,” see, for example, I. Bennett Capers, Crime,
Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835 (2008); Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,”
and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying:
Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996).
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1. Wiretapping Statutes
Many state statutes originally drafted to regulate wiretapping prohibit more generally the recording or interception of oral communi76
cations unless all parties to the conversation consent. Police officers
regularly rely on these statutes to arrest citizens who insist on recording the officers without their consent, often after the citizens have
77
used the records to file complaints against the police. Some states
have construed their statutes to preclude such prosecutions on the
ground that exercises of public authority by police officers cannot by

76

See Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the Law of
Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, 868, 869 & n.313, 870-81, app. C (1998) (discussing consent requirements in state eavesdropping and wiretapping statutes and enumerating eleven states that prohibit single-party-consent recordings); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, I Spy: The Newsgatherer Under Cover, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1215, 1216 &
n.139, 1217 (2000) (identifying thirteen states requiring both parties to consent to a
recorded conversation).
Some statutes also prohibit the capture of visual images. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-21-1 (1988); see also People v. Gibbons, 263 Cal. Rptr. 905, 908-09 (Ct. App.
1989) (interpreting a statute punishing nonconsenual recording of confidential
“communications” to reach videotaping of expressive conduct in sexual encounters);
cf. THE REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Can We Tape? (2008), http://
www.rcfp.org/taping/index.html (“At least 24 states have laws outlawing certain uses
of hidden cameras in private places . . . .”).
77
See, e.g., Kat Kanning, SPCA Joins the Police State, N.H. FREE PRESS, Nov. 2008, at 8
(describing the arrest of Cooper Travis “at his home in Candia, New Hampshire for refusing to turn off his video camera while speaking with a police officer”); Annys Shin, From
YouTube to Your Local Court, WASH. POST, June 16, 2010, at A1 (describing an early-morning
raid and wiretapping prosecution of Anthony Graber, who had posted on YouTube his
helmet-camera video of a police officer who had stopped his motorcycle for speeding);
Andrew Wolfe, Vindication: Police Drop Wiretap Charges, NASHUA TEL., Aug. 5, 2006, at 1 (describing the arrest of Michael Gannon after his home security camera videotaped conversations with New Hampshire detectives at his door and after he took the videotape to police headquarters to complain about harassment, though the case was later dropped); Jon
Yates, Rights, Eavesdropping Law Collide in Filmmakers’ Case, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 7, 2004, § 2, at 1
(describing freelance documentary filmmakers who had videotaped traffic stops:
“[P]olice seized Miller’s video camera. . . . [Filmmakers] submitted [the] documentary to
Urbana Public Television, prosecutors confiscated that, too, and charged the two with eavesdropping . . . .”); Derrick Blakely, Artist Charged for Eavesdropping During His Arrest,
CBS2CHICAGO.COM, Jan. 29, 2010, http://cbs2chicago.com/local/artist.chris.drew.2.
1458494.html (recounting felony prosecution of a street vendor for recording police officers without their consent); Mary Schenk, Eavesdropping Charges Dismissed, NEWSGAZETTE (Champaign), Dec. 2, 2004, http://www.news-gazette.com/news/local/2004/
-12/-02/eavesdropping_charges_dismissed (describing the decision of Champaign County
State’s Attorney to drop charges against members of a “community watchdog group”);
Ray Sanchez, Growing Number of Prosecutions for Videotaping the Police, ABCNEWS.COM,
July 19, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/US/TheLaw/videotaping-cops-arrest/story?id=
11179076 (describing Graber’s arrest in Maryland for videotaping police, as well as arrests
in Florida and New Hampshire). For other examples, see infra notes 78-95.
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their nature support an expectation of privacy. The state of Washington has been clearest on this point, refusing to “transform the privacy
act into a sword available for use against individuals by public officers
78
acting in their official capacity.” Pennsylvania case law similarly excludes recordings of law enforcement officials’ exercise of official authority in public settings from the consent requirement because officials lack the legitimate expectation of privacy required for statutory
79
protection. And a Maryland judge recently rebuffed efforts to prosecute an inconvenient videographer under the state wiretap statute,
78

State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); see also Johnson v.
Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Flora and ruling that police officers do
not have an expectation of privacy when performing an official function on a public
thoroughfare); Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Flora and noting that “[t]ape recording officers conducting a traffic stop is not a crime in Washington”), rev’d on other grounds, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004); Lewis v. Dep’t of
Licensing, 139 P.3d 1078, 1084 (Wash. 2006) (citing Alford and Flora with approval and
holding that “traffic stop conversations are not private for purposes of the privacy act”).
New Jersey courts have held that police officers could assert no Wiretap Act claim
against media “testers”—minorities hired by news outlets to drive expensive cars—who
recorded their racial profiling in a highway stop. See Hornberger v. ABC, Inc., 799
A.2d 566, 594-95 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2002) (concluding that police did not have an expectation of privacy during a traffic stop filmed through an arrangement with ABC); see
also Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a wiretap claim by
police officers who alleged that an audio recording of an incident in which the officers
were accused of using excessive force on a prisoner constituted an unlawful interception of private communication).
79
See, e.g., Agnew v. Dupler, 717 A.2d 519, 523-24 (Pa. 1998) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy for police conversations conducted in the squad room,
which could be overheard without amplification); Commonwealth v. Henlen, 564 A.2d
905, 907 (Pa. 1989) (holding that a suspect interviewed by a state trooper who submitted a recorded interview in a complaint against a state trooper could not be prosecuted
for violating the Wiretap Act).
Pennsylvania police officers, however, continue to invoke the wiretap statute
against those who antagonize them by recording them. See, e.g., Kelly v. Borough of
Carlisle, No. 09-2644, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 20430, at *22 (3d Cir. Oct. 4, 2010) (“[A]t
the time of Kelly’s arrest, it was clearly established that a reasonable expectation of privacy was a prerequisite for a Wiretap Act violation. Even more to the point, two Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases—one almost 20 years old at the time of Kelly’s arrest—
had held that covertly recording police officers was not a violation of the Act. Finally,
it was also clearly established that police officers do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy when recording conversations with suspects.”); Matheny v. County of Allegheny, No. 09-1070, 2010 WL 1007859, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010) (granting qualified immunity for police officers who arrested an activist on wiretap charges for the
video recording of a friend’s detention despite later dismissal of charges); cf. Paula
Reed Ward, DA’s Office Agrees to Unusual Settlement, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, July 15,
2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 14156921 (describing the agreement of the District Attorney’s office in Matheny to distribute legal memorandum concluding that recording police in public does not violate Wiretap Act). Readers should be aware that I
serve as counsel to the team that represents the plaintiff in Matheny.
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commenting that “[i]n this rapid information technology era in which
we live, it is hard to imagine that either an offender or an officer
would have any reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to what
80
is said between them in a traffic stop on a public highway.”
Other states, however, have upheld prosecutions of citizens who
record police in the exercise of their duties. The leading case is
81
Commonwealth v. Hyde, in which the defendant tape-recorded a traffic stop during which he contended that he was harassed because of
his long hair. When Hyde went to the police station to file a formal
complaint and submitted the tape recording as substantiation, he
was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted under the Massachusetts
Wiretap Act on the ground that he had not obtained the consent of
82
the arresting officers. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction and concluded that “the Legislature
intended . . . strictly to prohibit all secret recordings by members of
the public, including recordings of police officers or other public officials interacting with members of the public, when made without their
83
permission or knowledge.” In the aftermath of Hyde, Massachusetts
police officers invoked the wiretapping statute to arrest bystanders
84
Massachusetts courts have
who recorded arrests on cell phones.
80

State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *17 (Sept. 27,
2010). The judge continued, “Those of us who are public officials and are entrusted
with the power of the state are ultimately accountable to the public. When we exercise
that power in public fora, we should not expect our actions to be shielded from public
observation. Sed quis custodiet ipsos cutodes [sic].” Id. at *35 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
81
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001). For adverse commentary on Hyde, see, for example, Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the
Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 649-52 (2009). See also id. (“It is
inconsistent with democracy and democratic political accountability for government
officials to have protectable privacy interests when performing official functions . . . .”);
Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape Recording to
Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1551-55 (2008) (arguing that citizen recordings provide a valuable external check on police corruption and that current protections against abuse are insufficient).
82
Hyde, 750 N.E. 2d at 964-65.
83
Id. at 967.
84
See Daniel Rowinski, Police Fight Cell Phone Recordings: Witnesses Taking Audio of
Officers Arrested, Charged with Illegal Surveillance, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2010, at 1, available
at 2010 WLNR 610060 (describing arrests in Massachusetts of civilians recording police
officers in 2007 and 2008); Harvey Silverglate & James Tierney, Echoes of Rodney King,
BOS. PHOENIX, Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://thephoenix.com/boston/News/
56680-Echoes-of-Rodney-King (recounting arrest of Simon Glik, who “used his cell
phone to record Boston police officers making what he thought was an overly forceful
arrest”); cf. Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2007) (enjoining police officers from interfering with Internet publication of images of a warrantless police
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upheld the conviction of a freelance journalist who photographed and
85
tape-recorded police officers at a political rally, and refused to dismiss
a cause of action against a defendant who “[d]uring his arrest, transport
86
and booking . . . secretly tape recorded the entire incident.” In Illinois, where legislation was amended to target the recording of police
87
officers, the ACLU brought suit to invalidate the ban, although the
88
suit was recently dismissed for lack of standing.
Many states have not yet resolved the application of their wiretap
prohibitions to distributed image capture. In situations where there is
doubt about state law, courts have allowed arresting officers who seek
to suppress image capture and distribution to invoke qualified im89
munity to shield their arrests from subsequent damage actions.
2. Catchall Statutes: Interference, Disobedience, and
Disorderly Conduct
Where wiretap prohibitions do not apply, officers faced with defiant videographers frequently turn to broader criminal statutes that
provide substantial enforcement discretion. In recent years, police officers in Philadelphia arrested a man who filmed the arrest of his
90
neighbor on a cell phone for “obstructing an investigation.” Police
search and arrest recorded on “nanny-cam,” but suggesting that the capture of images
could be subject to prosecution in cases where the “government interests in preserving
privacy and deterring illegal interceptions” are more compelling).
85
Commonwealth v. Manzelli, 864 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
86
Gouin v. Gouin, 249 F. Supp. 2d 62, 79 (D. Mass. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
87
Compare People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346, 350 (Ill. 1986) (holding that a
wiretap statute did not forbid recording police officers), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/14-1(d) (West Supp. 2009) (superseding Beardsley, and defining “conversation” as “any oral communication . . . regardless of whether one or more of the parties
intended their communication to be of a private nature”).
88
ACLU v. Alvarez, No. 10-5235, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 115354, at *6, *11 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 28, 2010); see also Becky Schlikerman & Kristen Mack, ACLU Challenges State’s Eavesdropping Law, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 20, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 16605495 (describing the ACLU’s legal action).
89
See, e.g., Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1225, 1235 (9th Cir.
2006) (granting qualified immunity to an officer for seizure of the plaintiff’s camera
and arrest of the plaintiff for filming the officer and “juvenile ‘decoy’” seeking to purchase tobacco).
90
Cell Phone Picture Called Obstruction of Justice: Man Arrested for Shooting Photo of Police Activity, NBC10.COM, July 25, 2006 (quoting the photographer’s mother) (internal
quotation marks omitted), http://web.archive.org/web/20060821200354/http://
www.nbc10.com/news/9574663/detail.html. Creatively, the police also told the suspect “that he broke a[n imaginary] new law that prohibits people from taking pictures
of police with cell phones.” Id.; cf. Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 157-59 (11th Cir.
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in St. Louis arrested a photographer for “interfering” with an officer
91
when she recorded a police arrest of protesters at a health care rally.
Similar charges resulted in arrests of photographers at crime scenes
92
and fires in Illinois, Arkansas, and Louisiana.
A student photographer in State College, Pennsylvania who refused to cease photographing a riot faced trial for failure to obey an
93
officer, while a freelance photographer in Miami who insisted on
filming an arrest was acquitted of disorderly conduct and disobeying
94
an officer, but convicted of resisting arrest and obstructing a street.
Other police officers offended by citizens recording their activities have
95
recently arrested private videographers on charges of harassment.
1995) (reversing the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to a law enforcement
officer who arrested, and seized the film of, a demonstration participant for photographing undercover officers).
91
Dueling Protesters Disrupt Carnahan Forum on Aging, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Aug. 7, 2009, at A1.
92
See David Heinzmann, Photographer Finds Himself in Hot Water with Police, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 20, 2008, at 26, available at 2008 WLNR 22140824 (discussing two separate
arrests of a freelance photographer in Chicago); Stacy Hudson, Maumelle Reporter
Cleared of Charges, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec. 16, 2007, at 9, available at Factiva, Doc. No. AKDG000020071217e3cg0004c (discussing the arrest of a reporter who
took a picture of a house fire in Little Rock, though the charges were later dropped);
Sonia Smith, Photographer Arrested at Crime Scene, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Jan. 18, 2009,
at B2 (detailing the arrest of a photographer at a crime scene in Baton Rouge for interfering with a homicide investigation).
93
Heather Schmelzlen, Photographer Receives Misdemeanor Charges, THE DAILY
COLLEGIAN, Nov. 7, 2008, http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/2008/11/07/
photographer_receives_misdemea.aspx.
94
See Press Release, Society of Professional Journalists, SPJ Leaders Express Disappointment in First Amendment Violation in Miami ( June 19, 2008), available at
http://www.spj.org/news.asp?REF=812#812; see also Tarus v. Borough of Pine Hill,
916 A.2d 1036, 1042-44 (N.J. 2007) (discussing the arrest for disorderly conduct of a
resident who refused to cease filming a public meeting); Special Officer Suspended After
Arrest of Cameraman, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.
firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=20796 (describing the suspension of an officer in Newark, New Jersey, for arresting a television cameraman for disorderly conduct for filming a demonstration); Carlos Miller, Homeland Security Cop Arrests Man for
Filming FBI Building in NYC, PHOTOGRAPHY IS NOT A CRIME, PIXIQ (Aug. 20, 2009,
1:59 AM), http://carlosmiller.com/2009/08/20/homeland-security-arrests-man-forfilming-fbi-building-in-nyc/ (discussing a photographer who was arrested for “disorderly conduct, failure to comply and impeding duties of a federal officer” and whose camera was seized for taking photos of an FBI building); Search and Seizure Warrant, In Re
Search of a Silver and Black Aiptek Handheld Video Camera Serial No. BMC70155393
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2009), available at http://carlosmiller.com/wp-content/uploads/
2009/08/randallthomas.pdf (arrest and search warrant).
95
See, e.g., Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (discussing the arrest of a private videographer who filmed state troopers on a public
highway on charges of harassment); Complaint at 1-2, Hookway v. E. Vincent Twp.,
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3. Fiat: The “Crime” of Photographic Defiance of Authority
In the absence of viable charges under established criminal law,
offended police officers frequently have baldly demanded that photographers cease their activities and surrender captured images; those
96
who fail to comply with official fiat are subjected to arrest. Thus, in
Houston, authorities recently agreed to a $1.7 million settlement of a
lawsuit initiated by Erik and Sean Ibarra, who were arrested in 2002 at
their home for photographing a sheriff department’s drug raid at a
neighbor’s home and videotaping the subsequent struggle as sheriffs’
deputies pursued the Ibarra brothers into their home to destroy the
97
images. Although the former district attorney for the county later
acknowledged that taking photos of officers “is not, per se, illegal,” the
98
sheriff’s department maintains that the deputies acted appropriately.
Police in Seattle settled a case for the arrest of Bogdan Mohora,
an amateur photographer who was taking pictures of scenery when he
captured images of an arrest on a public street and refused to relinquish the photos to the pictured officers. He was released when no
99
charges against him could be substantiated. Similarly, a press photoNo. 08-05821 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2008) (complaint against police who arrested a videographer); see also Tim Eberly, Man Is Cleared to Record Police, THE FRESNO BEE, June 6,
2006, at B1, available at 2006 WLNR 9703080 (reporting the dismissal of a police effort to enjoin a private videographer for harassment, and the imposition of attorneys’
fees on the city); Reedley Drops Case Against Cop Watcher, KFSN-TV, Mar. 8, 2006, updated Mar. 23, 2006, http://abclocal.go.com/kfsn/story?section=news/local&id=
3975295 (discussing the charges against an activist who videotapes police and posts
videos on “Copwatch” blog).
96
See, e.g., Sean Gardiner, Shoot First, Hand Over Film Later, VILLAGE VOICE (New
York), June 11–17, 2008, at 9 (reporting an incident in which police demanded that a
commercial photographer hand over film that he shot in public on Coney Island). For
ongoing documentation of examples of harassment of photographers in public, see
links at Carlos Miller, Photography Is Not a Crime, PIXIQ, http://carlosmiller.com (last
visited Oct. 15, 2010).
97
Peggy O’Hare et al., County Settles with Ibarras for $1.7 Million, HOUS. CHRON.,
Mar. 4, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 4321540.
98
Peggy O’Hare, Ex-DA Takes Stand in Trial, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2008, at B1
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at 2008 WLNR 3846533; see also O’Hare,
supra note 97, at A1 (reporting that the sheriff did “not see where his deputies did anything blatantly wrong”); cf. Dan McKay, Officer Contests Firing over Attack, ALBUQUERQUE
J., Jan. 7, 2009, at C2, available at LEXIS (discussing a case in which police officer Daniel Guzman “had been caught on camera sizing up, then lunging at veteran KOB-TV
cameraman Rick Foley”).
99
Scott Gutierrez, Photographer Gets $8000 for Wrongful-Arrest Claim, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Nov. 13, 2007, at B2, available at 2007 WLNR 22586931. The Seattle police department subsequently issued a policy that “clearly reminds officers that bystanders
have a right to watch or film officers making an arrest.” Scott Gutierrez, Policy Clarifies
Bystanders’ Rights in Police Incidents, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 5, 2008, at
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grapher who was arrested and then released after taking photographs
at the 2008 Republican National Convention in Minneapolis reports
hearing the arresting officer inquire, after tackling him and tying his
100
hands, “What do we charge him with?”
Since September 11, a number of governmental agencies have
promulgated warnings that photography of public locations could be
101
a precursor to terrorist attacks.
As these concerns collide with the
B3. The policy apparently has been less than fully internalized. See Sabra Gertsch,
Cell Phone Snapshot Lands Man in Jail, KOMONEWS.COM, May 14, 2009, http://
www.komonews.com/news/45065832.html (describing a twenty-nine-year-old who was
detained, handcuffed, and arrested after taking a photo of armored car guards opening
an ATM machine); see also Photographer, Rick Dembow Begins Trial and Lawsuit Against City of
New York and NYPD, NAT’L PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N (Jan. 2009), http://
www.nppa2.org/2009_archives/0109_archives.html#rick_dembow (“As Rick Dembow
attempted to photograph the arrest of Peter Foley an [NYPD] officer was instructed to
arrest and handcuff Dembow.”); Rafael Martínez Alequín, NYPD Pix the Wrong Guy, YOUR
FREE PRESS (Feb. 18, 2009, 5:16 PM), http://yourfreepress.blogspot.com/2009/02/nypdpix-wrong-guy.html (discussing the settlement of the Dembow case for $45,000).
100
David Brauer, AP Photographer’s Last Pre-arrest Shot Is a Stunner, MINNEAPOLIS
POST, Sept. 3, 2008 (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.minnpost.com/
stories/2008/09/03/3320/ap_photographers_last_pre-arrest_shot_is_a_stunner. Airline officials have demonstrated a similar sense of entitlement. See Aaron Royster,
Woman Detained by Airline over Video, KINGMAN DAILY MINER, Aug. 7, 2008, http://
www.kingmandailyminer.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&subsectionID=1&articleID=16860
(describing the arrest of an airline passenger who refused to delete video of an in-flight
argument between passengers upon demand of the flight attendant).
101
See, e.g., INFO. SHARING ENV’T, INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT (ISE)
FUNCTIONAL STANDARD (FS) SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTING (SAR) VERSION 1.5, at
29 & n.11 (2009), available at http://www.niem.gov/pdf/ISE-FS-200_ISE-SAR_
Functional_Standard_V1_5_Issued.pdf (suggesting investigation and reporting of the
“[t]aking [of] pictures or video of facilities, buildings, or infrastructure in a manner
that would arouse suspicion in a reasonable person,” but observing in a footnote that
such activities are generally “First Amendment-protected activities”); Bianca Phillips,
Tourist or Terrorist?, MEMPHIS FLYER, Apr. 3, 2008, at 9, available at 2008 WLNR 7466117
(quoting an official of the Tennessee Fusion Center as saying “[y]ou may think a guy is
just shooting pictures, but if you report it to us, we’ll send it on to the FBI” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Report Suspicious Activity, COLO. INFO. ANALYSIS CTR.,
https://www.ciac.co.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=main.incident (last visited Oct.15,
2010) (seeking reports of “the use of cameras, note taking, drawing diagrams, [or] annotating on maps” as one of the “Eight Signs of Terrorism”); see generally Letter from
Ronald A. Jackson, Ass’t Gen. Counsel for Operations, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., to Arthur
B. Spitzer, Legal Dir. A.C.L.U. of the Nat’l Capital Area (Aug. 19, 2009), available at
http://transportation.house.gov/Media/fileEconomics%20Development/20090923/
McCann%20Testimony.pdf (discussing the policy regarding photography of Department
of Transportation buildings); Special Security Bulletin, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Photography of Federally Owned and Leased Facilities (Nov. 10, 2004), available at
http://transportation.house.gov/Media/file/Economic%20Development/20090923/
McCann%20Testimony.pdf (outlining guidelines regarding photography of federal
facilities); Transportation Walk Photographer Harassment (Near National’s Park), FLICKR
(Apr. 15, 2009, 8:45 AM), http://www.flickr.com/groups/dcphotorights/discuss/

KREIMER FINAL REVISED 2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Pervasive Image Capture

1/11/2011 2:31 PM

365

spread of digital photography, baseless arrests of landscape photographers on suspicion of terrorism have proliferated.
New York City has been the epicenter of the phenomenon. Photographers have been arrested or required to relinquish their images for
102
taking photographs near landmarks and subway stations and for
103
photographing trains.
Amtrak police arrested a New York photographer for capturing images in order to participate in an Amtrak104
sponsored photography contest. The Department of Homeland Security recently settled a case arising out of an arrest for photographing
the exterior of a New York federal courthouse; the plaintiff recovered
damages, and the Federal Protective Service agreed to issue a directive

72157616811370838 (discussing incidents in which photographers were prevented from
capturing images of Department of Transportation buildings).
102
Graduate student Arun Wiita was detained while taking pictures near a subway station, and movie maker Rakesh Sharma was detained while filming taxis in
Manhattan. See Edith Honan, New York City Sued for Harassing Photographers, REUTERS, Dec. 6, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/
idUSN0625091620071206. Both photographers sued and both cases were ultimately
settled. See Indian Filmmaker Wins NY Lawsuit, INDIAN EXPRESS (May 25, 2007)
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indian-filmmaker-wins-ny-lawsuit/31794 (detailing the settlement of the Sharma case for damages and agreement to adopt new rules
regarding photography of public places); Interview by Jen Carlson with Arun Wiita, GOTHAMIST ( June 19, 2009), http://gothamist.com/2009/06/19/arun_wilta_subway_
project_1.php (describing the settlement of the Wiita case for damages).
103
See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, No Photo Ban in Subways, Yet an Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2009, at A21 (describing the arrest of Robert Taylor for photographing subway trains,
with police spokesman stating that “officers misinterpreted the rules concerning photography,” but “will press on with charges of impeding traffic and unreasonable noise”
(quoting Paul J. Browne, NYPD chief spokesman) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Daryl Lang, No Photo Ban, But Photogs Still Getting Hassled over Transit Shots, PHOTO DISTRICT NEWS (Mar. 17, 2006), http://www.pdnonline.com/pdn/esearch/
article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002199058 (describing harassment by transit police intended to stop photographers from taking pictures of the Long Island Railroad).
104
Carlos Miller, Amtrak Photo Contestant Arrested by Amtrak Police in NYC’s Penn Station, PHOTOGRAPHY IS NOT A CRIME (Dec. 27, 2008, 3:29 AM), http://
carlosmiller.com/2008/12/27/amtrak-police-arrest-photographer-participating-inamtrak-photo-contest; see also Colbert Report, Nailed ‘Em: Amtrak Photographer (Comedy
Central television broadcast, Feb. 2, 2009), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/
the-colbert-report-videos/217341/february-02-2009/nailed--em-amtrak-photographer
(humorously reporting the news story of Amtrak police arresting photographer Duane
Kerzic); Daryl Lang, Arrested for Photographing a Train: “It’s Almost Embarrassing,” PHOTO
DISTRICT NEWS (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.pdnonline.com/pdn/content_display/
esearch/e3i81e87508e923955f84619b82090e19f2 (describing the “five-figure settlement” of Kerzic’s false-arrest suit after broadcast of the Colbert piece (quoting Todd
Maisel, Region 2 Director of the Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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acknowledging the “public’s general right to photograph the exterior
105
of federal courthouses from publicly accessible spaces.”
Similar arrests have befallen recreational photographers around
106
the country, as well as an art professor who photographed power
107
lines in Snohomish, Washington, and a news photographer who
108
photographed a nuclear plant in Vermont.
Many of these prosecutions have ultimately been dropped or
dismissed, but the threat of arrest remains a potent deterrent to
spontaneous photographers who have no deep commitment to capturing any particular image. Even for photographers and videographers who set out to document specific interactions, the opportunity to ultimately return to their efforts after an arrest does little to
mitigate the obstacle to effective participation in digital discourse.
The crucial importance of image capture lies precisely in its provision
of verifiable contemporaneous records of events; those records are
lost when arrest prevents recording.
IV. THE PUZZLES OF FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF
PERVASIVE IMAGE CAPTURE
Pervasive image capture confronts a landscape of legal risks that
threatens its promises of public dialogue and private memory. The
conjunctive prospects of expanded common law torts, statutory con105

Stipulation and Order of Dismissal at 2, Musumeci v. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 10-3370 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010); see also David W. Dunlap, You Can Photograph That Federal Building, N.Y. TIMES BLOGS (Oct. 18, 2010, 6:00 PM),
http://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/you-can-photograph-that-federal-building.
106
See Union Station: A Comprehensive Look at the Private Management, the Public Space,
and the Intermodal Spaces Present and Future: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev.,
Pub. Bldgs., and Emergency Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 110th
Cong. 143-55 (2008) (statement of Erin McCann, amateur photographer) (describing
harassment of photographers in Union Station); Annys Shin, When Freedom of Photography Doesn’t Click, WASH. POST, July 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/25/AR2010072502795.html?nav=emailpage (reporting that a guard ordered a recreational photographer not to photograph a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development building); Lang, supra note 104 (“It’s
not just New York City Transit, it’s across the country” (quoting Todd Maisel, Region 2
Director of the Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
107
See Scheier v. City of Snohomish, No. 07-1925, 2008 WL 4812336, at *1-3 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 4, 2008); see also Robert L. Jamieson, Jr., We’ve Seen the Enemy, and He Is Us:
Photo Student Experiences the ‘Real Threat’ To America, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July
14, 2004, at B1, available at LEXIS (reporting that a photography student was detained
by police for taking pictures of a tourist attraction at Ballard Locks).
108
Linda Rothstein, Editor’s Note, Nuclear Insecurity, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 2.
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straints, and the invocation of catchall statutes interact with law enforcement authority to retaliate against photographers or videographers. To resolve the confrontation, courts must address the status
of the emerging medium under the First Amendment. Although
many courts have recognized First Amendment protection, their analyses do not effectively respond to other commentators and courts
who suggest that image capture lies outside the aegis of the First
Amendment. It is to this task that I now turn.
In the last decade, a solid line of courts has recognized that image
capture can claim protection under the First Amendment. The First
Circuit upheld a damages award against a police officer who arrested
an amateur video journalist for recording a conversation between
government officials following a public meeting, commenting that the
plaintiff’s activities involved “the exercise of his First Amendment
109
The Second Circuit determined that the First Amendment
rights.”
protects the right of an art photographer to use nude models for a
110
photo shoot. The Ninth Circuit sustained a cause of action against a
police officer who allegedly assaulted an amateur photographer seeking to film a political demonstration, recognizing a “First Amendment
111
The Eleventh Circuit obright to film matters of public interest.”
109

Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Demarest v.
Athol/Orange Cmty. Television, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94-95 (D. Mass. 2002) (finding that producers for a community television channel had “a constitutionally protected right to record matters of public interest” and could not be precluded from recording statements in public without signed consents); Cirelli v. Town of Johnston Sch.
Dist., 897 F. Supp. 663, 669 (D.R.I. 1995) (protecting the right of a teacher to videotape health-code violations while on school grounds); Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733
F. Supp. 465, 473 (D.N.H. 1990) (finding First Amendment protection for a news photographer taking pictures at an accident scene).
110
Tunick v. Safir, 228 F.3d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d
67, 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (“While there may be classroom hypotheticals that explore the hazy
line between nude photography as unprotected conduct and nude photography as artistic expression, this is not such a case.”). Lower courts in the Second Circuit have recognized that the First Amendment constrains efforts to interfere with image capture. See,
e.g., Davis v. Stratton, 575 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (N.D.N.Y 2008) (holding that the activity
of a preacher videotaping his presentation on a college campus is protected), rev’d on other grounds, Davis v. Stratton, 360 F. App’x 182 (2d Cir. 2010); Baker v. City of New York,
No. 01-4888, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18100, at *17-19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2002) (determining that a professional photographer offering to photograph passersby could invoke First
Amendment protections); Krukowski v. Swords, 15 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194-96 (D. Conn.
1998) (acknowledging that the photographer photographing and videotaping sessions of
an aspiring model invoked First Amendment protections).
111
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Schnell v.
City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 1969) (allowing a cause of action by
news photographers who covered demonstrations at the 1968 Democratic National
Convention in Chicago against the police for “interfering with plaintiffs’ constitutional
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served that members of the public have “a First Amendment right,
subject to reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct” because “[t]he First Amendment
protects the right to gather information about what public officials do
112
on public property.” Federal trial judges in other circuits have come
113
to similar conclusions.
These cases, however, in the main assert, rather than argue for, First
114
Amendment protection, and other authorities question whether proright to . . . photograph news events” (internal quotation marks omitted)), overruled on
other grounds, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Cuviello v. City of Stockton, No. 07-1625, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4896, at *34-36 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009) (holding that animal rights protestors have a First Amendment right to videotape a circus
from a public street); Cuviello v. City of Oakland, No. 06-5517, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59833, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (same); cf. Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676,
682-83, 687 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that state law “does not criminalize the recording of a ‘police officer in the performance of an official function on a public thoroughfare,’” but declining to reach the First Amendment claim on procedural grounds
(quoting Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2003))); Alford, 333 F.3d at 976
(same), rev’d on other grounds, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004).
112
Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding plaintiffs’ interest in filming
public meetings may be protected by the First Amendment if the reason for the ban
was not “content-neutral”); cf. Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 157-59 (11th Cir. 1995)
(per curiam) (reversing the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to a police officer who arrested and seized the film of a political demonstration participant who
photographed undercover officers).
113
See Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 513 n.14
(D.N.J. 2006) (finding that plaintiff’s “photography . . . was part and parcel of her political activism” and therefore should be analyzed like speech under the First Amendment); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that
the plaintiff had a First Amendment right to videotape state troopers conducting truck
inspections on a public highway); Lambert v. Polk Cnty., 723 F. Supp. 128, 133 (S.D.
Iowa 1989) (finding that the plaintiff had a First Amendment right to display and disseminate a videotape he recorded of a street fight occurring while he was present with
a video camera); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 638 (D. Minn.
1972) (suggesting that a news photographer at a crime scene has a First Amendment
right to be present “in public places and on public property to gather information,
photographically or otherwise”); State v. Graber, No. 10-0647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS
7, at *34 (Sept. 27, 2010) (“Many courts have held that the video taping of public
events is protected under the First Amendment. . . . With all due respect to the Maryland General Assembly, it cannot criminalize otherwise protected activity.”).
114
The same is largely true of commentators. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The
Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1511 (2000) (“It is inconceivable, for example,
that a ban on capturing all photographic images in public could possibly be squared
with the First Amendment . . . .”); cf. WILLIAM GOLDMAN, THE PRINCESS BRIDE: S. MORGENSTERN’S CLASSIC TALE OF TRUE LOVE AND HIGH ADVENTURE 114 (Harcourt 2007).
A notable exception is the thoughtful work of Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, who
has considered in admirable depth the First Amendment protection of photography
and the right to gather information more generally. See Zimmerman, supra note 76, at
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115

hibitions of image capture should raise First Amendment objections.
Even proponents of the virtues of image capture tend to be tentative in
116
asserting its protected status in First Amendment theory and doctrine.
It is therefore important to examine in some detail both the basis for
doubts and the reasons that those doubts are ultimately unsustainable.

1231 (“Reason, and not emotion, ought to drive the development of the law about
newsgathering.”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to
Say? One View of the Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 325-32 (2004) (arguing
that the right to gather content for speech is a prerequisite to the full exercise of the
right to free speech); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposal for the Constitutional Protection of the News-Gathering Process,
1980 DUKE L.J. 641, 653-65 (1980) (arguing that the right to record falls within the
general category of “speech” and that different mediums convey different meanings);
see also Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1097 (1999) (discussing First Amendment implications of antipaparazzi
statutes and tort doctrine).
115
See, e.g., Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, No. 09-2644, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 20430, at
*36-37 (3d Cir. Pa. Oct. 4, 2010) (“[T]he cases addressing the right of access to information and the right of free expression do not provide a clear rule regarding First Amendment rights to obtain information by videotaping . . . police officers during traffic
stops.”); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[V]ideotaping or photographing the police in the performance of their duties on public property may be a protected activity.”); Banks v. Gallagher, No. 08-1110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55308, at *29-37
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2010) (defendant police officer entitled to qualified immunity due to
the lack of “a clearly established right to videotape a police officer”), adopted by Banks v.
Gallagher, No. 08-1110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45364 (M.D. Pa. May 10, 2010); Gravolet v.
Tassin, No. 08-3646, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45876, at *11-12 (E.D. La. June 2, 2009)
(same); McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1206 (D. Kan. 2004)
(“Even if Plaintiffs have alleged a constitutional violation, however, the court determines
that it is not clearly established that destruction of recordings constitutes violation of the
First Amendment.”), aff’d, 130 F. App’x 987 (10th Cir. 2005); see also cases and authorities
cited infra notes 116, 118, 119, 139-41, and 179-79.
116
See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249,
255 (2004) (“[T]he Court has created a legal scheme governing a First Amendment
right to gather information that is . . . fragmented and inconsistent . . . .”); Wasserman,
supra note 81, at 614 (“The answers to these questions move us into an uncharted and
under-theorized First Amendment realm.”); Zimmerman, supra note 76, at 1209 (“[I]t
is not obvious whether a tort rule or criminal statute that prohibits recordation of
something that can legally be heard or observed is a neutral regulation of an action or
a direct restriction on speech.”); Mishra, supra note 81, at 1550 (“[T]he First Amendment protects individuals . . . who distribute recordings of illegal police conduct. But it
probably does not protect individuals . . . who produce the recordings.”).
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V. IMAGE CAPTURE AND THE DEFINITION OF “SPEECH”
A. Images and Messages: “Speech,” “Action,” and
“Inherently Expressive” Media
An initial set of objections begins with the words of the First
Amendment: its protection extends only to freedom of “speech” and
117
Some discursive acts which convey messages—for ex“the press.”
ample, American Sign Language gestures or tapping keys in Morse
code—are clearly recognizable as “speech.” But an image, it is said, is
not necessarily “speech”; it “must communicate some idea in order to
118
be protected under the First Amendment.” Image capture, skeptics
119
maintain, records data rather than communicating ideas.
There is a core of force to this objection: it is common currency
that not all actions can claim First Amendment protection. As the
Court observed, “[I]t is possible to find some kernel of expression in
almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down
the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a
kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of
117

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Montefusco v. Nassau County, 39 F. Supp. 2d 231, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing
Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (2d Cir. 1996)). Montefusco also suggested
that photographs captured by a voyeuristic hobbyist contained “no identifiable message sought to be communicated” and therefore were without First Amendment protection. Id. at 242, n.7. See Ramberran v. Dellacona, No. 07-0304, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 25476, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (stating that the plaintiff “has not alleged any
expressive or artistic purpose for filming students in his mathematics classroom . . . [and therefore] allegations fail to demonstrate any infringement of protected speech”); Porat v. Lincoln Towers Cmty. Ass’n, No. 04-3199, 2005 WL 646093, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2005) (“[I]t is well established that in order to be protected under the First Amendment, images must communicate some idea.”); Larsen v. Fort
Wayne Police Dep’t, No. 09-0055, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 57955, at *11 (N.D. Ind. June
11, 2010) (citing and quoting Porat); see also Dreibelbis v. Scholton, No. 05-2312, 2006
U.S. Dist LEXIS 37217, at *10 (M.D. Pa. June 7, 2006) (“[A] dispute over child custody
or visitation is of private, familial and personal concern. . . . Plaintiff’s videotaping was
not a protected activity under the First Amendment . . . .”), aff’d, 274 F. App’x 183 (3d
Cir. 2008); State v. Wright, 931 So. 2d 432, 443 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (finding a video
voyeurism statute “not overbroad because the challenged statute affects conduct rather
than speech”).
119
Professor McDonald, for example, accepts this analysis of free speech protection while arguing for the importance of a separate right to gather information under
the press clause. See McDonald, supra note 116, at 268 (“Information gathering frequently consists of predominantly non-expressive conduct that is unable to lay claim to
the core First Amendment protection accorded to expression itself.”); see also Wasserman, supra note 81, at 655 (“[T]he conduct at issue—using cameras, audio and video
recorders, and computers to gather information for dissemination—cannot, in itself,
be characterized as ‘expressive activity.’” (quoting McDonald, supra note 116, at 270)).
118
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120

the First Amendment.”
In determining whether an isolated act is
121
protectable “symbolic speech,” opinions of the Court often give
122
weight to the presence or absence of a “message conveyed.”
In addressing this issue, however, it will not do to place too much
emphasis on the words “speech” and “press.” Handwritten letters fall
uncontroversially within the protection of the First Amendment,
though they are neither “spoken” nor printed on a “press.” The Framers arguably viewed the First Amendment as a metonymic whole:
protection of speech, press, and assembly were parts of the same fa123
bric of intellectual autonomy as religion.
In First Amendment doctrine, narrow parsing of the words of the
Amendment has not determined its reach. By its terms, the Amendment binds only Congress. Yet the First Amendment applies to actions of the federal executive and judiciary, and the First Amendment
constrains the states not by virtue of its text, but because of incorporation through the due process clause.

120

City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989). The Court in this case held
that patronizing a dance hall for recreation was not protected speech. Id. The Supreme Court has regularly rejected the “view that an apparently limitless variety of
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), quoted
with approval in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam); see
also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
121
See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65
(2006) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
122
See, e.g., id. at 63 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual
Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 527 (1995)). The Court also stated that the necessity of explanatory speech to convey the message “is strong evidence that the conduct
at issue . . . is not so inherently expressive that it warrants protection.” Id. at 66; see
also, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (“Because the term ‘loiter’ is defined as remaining in one place ‘with no apparent purpose,’ it is also clear
that it does not prohibit any form of conduct that is apparently intended to convey a
message.”); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (“[W]e have asked whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’” (quoting Spence, 418
U.S. at 410-11)).
123
See, e.g., Resolutions Adopted by the Kentucky General Assembly (stating that
the First Amendment guards “in the same sentence, and under the same words, the
freedom of religion, of speech, and of the press, insomuch, that whatever violates either, throws down the sanctuary which covers the others”), in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 551, 552 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003); see also Eugene Volokh, Symbolic
Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1059 (2009)
(noting that early courts treated symbolic and verbal expression as “functionally equivalent when it came to speech restrictions”).
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More importantly, the requirement of identifying a “message conveyed” is generally applied by the Court only to conduct that is not
124
For courses of action that are
considered “inherently expressive.”
recognized by social practice as comprising media of expression, the
question is not whether a message is conveyed, but whether the con125
The Court
duct in question is a part of that recognized medium.
has recognized that “[m]usic, as a form of expression and communi126
cation, is protected under the First Amendment” without inquiring
into the particular message communicated by the music, if indeed
music could be rendered as propositional content. It has acknowledged that dancing “directed to an actual or hypothetical audience,”
which “gives expression at least to generalized emotion or feeling,” ra127
ther than an articulable “message,” is “inherently expressive.” It has
determined that the “protected expression that inheres in a parade is
not limited to its banners and songs . . . for the Constitution looks
128
Pabeyond written or spoken words as mediums of expression.”
rades, in our society, are media of expression, like visual art and poetry: “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection” for parades any more than it is for the “unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold

124

Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 49 (stating that conduct that is not “inherently expressive”
does not receive protection under O’Brien); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
695 n.22 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “the simple act of joining the
Scouts . . . is not inherently expressive”); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289
(2000) (plurality opinion) (noting that “[b]eing ‘in a state of nudity’ is not an inherently expressive condition” but that nude dancing may be protected depending on
“‘whether the State’s regulation is related to the suppression of expression’” (quoting
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403)); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 577 n.4 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (reasoning that nudity is “not normally engaged in for the purpose
of communicating an idea or emotion” and therefore is not “inherently expressive,”
or, in Justice Scalia’s words, “conventionally expressive”).
125
Dean Robert Post highlighted this point a decade and a half ago. See Robert
Post, Essay, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1253-57 (1995)
[hereinafter Post, Recuperating]. He reiterated the insight in Robert Post, Encryption
Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 717 (2000) [hereinafter Post, Encryption]. While his precise criteria for “constitutionally recognized media
for the communication of ideas,” Post, Recuperating, supra, at 1256, do not fully capture
the relevant case law or considerations, his basic point that First Amendment doctrine
borrows from social practice in recognizing “genre[s]” or “media” is profound and important. Id. at 1253.
126
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989).
127
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring); see also sources cited supra
note 124.
128
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995).
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Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” Public monuments constitute protected expression, though “monuments are almost certain to evoke different thoughts and sentiments in the minds
of different observers, and the effect of monuments that do not con130
tain text is likely to be even more variable.”
So it is with captured images. In the last two generations, emerging technology and social practice have made captured images part of
131
our cultural and political discourse.
Recognizing this development,
the Court has treated images as media of communication without inquiring into an illusively specific message. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the Court reversed a conclusion reached four decades earlier that
movies lie outside of the protection of the First Amendment, commenting that “[i]t cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of ideas[] . . . ranging from direct espousal of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of
132
In subsequent
thought which characterizes all artistic expression.”
decisions, the Court regularly confirmed that images in films can claim
First Amendment protection whether displayed publicly or reviewed in
133
private, without inquiry into a particular “message conveyed.”
129
130

Id.
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1136 (2009).

[I]t frequently is not possible to identify a single “message” that is conveyed by
an object or structure . . . . [By displaying] a privately donated monument . . . a city engages in expressive conduct, but the intended and perceived
significance of that conduct may not coincide with the thinking of the monument’s donor or creator.
Id.
131

See, e.g., DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE
371 (1973) (arguing that “[p]hotography took the first giant step toward democratizing the repeatable experience” and transforming the nature of public discourse); KEVIN MICHAEL DELUCA, IMAGE POLITICS: THE NEW RHETORIC OF ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM xi-xiii (1999) (examining the use of “image events” as a political tool); W.J.T.
MITCHELL, PICTURE THEORY: ESSAYS ON VISUAL AND VERBAL REPRESENTATION 11-34
(1994) (arguing for recognition of the “pictorial turn” defining cultural discourse);
Kevin Michael DeLuca & Jennifer Peeples, From Public Sphere to Public Screen: Democracy,
Activism, and the “Violence” of Seattle, 19 CRITICAL STUD. IN MEDIA COMMC’N 125, 127
(2002) (introducing the “‘public screen’ as a necessary supplement to the metaphor of
the public sphere for understanding today’s political scene”).
132
343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952), overruling in part Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n
of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). The Joseph Burstyn Court’s position was prefigured in
dictum in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), which said,
“We have no doubt that moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in
the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment.”
133
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826-27 (2000)
(invalidating limitations on an “adult oriented” cable channel); Schad v. Borough of
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The same conclusion has applied to images captured in a single
134
frame. Without inquiry into particular messages, the Court has deployed First Amendment principles to invalidate the prohibition of display in public view of “any motion picture, slide, or other exhibit in
135
which the human male or female bare buttocks” appear, the ban on
published illustrations that involve photographs of United States cur136
rency which are not “newsworthy,” an injunction against display of
137
“images observable” by women seeking abortions, and a statute prohibiting the production or possession of “any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computergenerated image or picture” that “appears to be[] of a minor engag138
ing in sexually explicit conduct.”
In the current state of the law and culture of discourse, captured
images—like words inscribed on parchment—fall within the protection of “freedom of speech.”
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (“Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First
Amendment guarantee.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565, 568 (1969) (reversing
an obscenity conviction for possession of three reels of eight-millimeter film and stating that “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch”).
134
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) (stating that First Amendment standards apply “to moving pictures, to photographs, and to words in
books . . . . As with pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings, both oral utterance and the printed word have First Amendment protection . . . .”); cf. Massachusetts
v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 591 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Photography, painting,
and other two-dimensional forms of artistic reproduction . . . are plainly expressive activities that ordinarily qualify for First Amendment Protection.”); United States v. ThirtySeven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376-77 (1971) (plurality opinion) (applying First
Amendment-based procedural requirements to the seizure of photographs).
135
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 207 (1975) (quoting a city ordinance) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984) (plurality opinion).
137
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994).
138
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(8)(B)(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1590 (2010) (invalidating a prohibition of depictions of animal
cruelty: “Most hunting videos, for example, are not obviously instructional in nature,
except in the sense that all life is a lesson.”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 n.18
(1982) (stating that depictions of nudity, “without more,” are protected expression); cf.
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 113 n.9, 115 n.11 (1990) (stating that a statute punishing a parent for giving “a family friend a picture of the parent’s infant taken while the
infant was unclothed” would “criminalize[] constitutionally protected conduct,” but
observing that, as construed, the statute prohibiting “possession and viewing of child
pornography” did not reach that conduct).
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B. “Speech” and the Question of Audience
To conclude that images can comprise constitutionally protected
expression does not end the matter. Skeptics raise a second objection. They argue that prohibitions on image capture, as opposed to
display, do not constitute prohibitions on “speech” subject to First
Amendment protection because the act of capturing images—unlike
139
their display—does not speak to an audience.
As one court put the claim, the act of capturing an image “does
not partake of the attributes of expression; it is conduct, pure and
140
simple.”
Another court took a similar approach: to establish First
Amendment protection, “there must still be (1) a message to be
communicated and (2) an audience to receive that message, regardless of the medium in which the message is sought to be ex-

139

This position emerged early in the second half of the twentieth century. E.g.,
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971) (“Privilege concepts developed . . . in privacy actions in which publication is an essential component are not
relevant in determining liability for intrusive conduct antedating publication.”); Alfred
Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1279
(1976) (“The act of intrusion does not involve communication. There are no problems
under the [F]irst [A]mendment when a recovery is granted against the landlord who
bugs the bedroom of his tenants . . . .”); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times
to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV.
935, 957 (1968) (“Intrusion does not raise [F]irst [A]mendment difficulties since its perpetration does not involve speech or other expression. It occurs by virtue of the physical
or mechanical observation of the private affairs of another . . . .”).
The idea recurs in contemporary analysis. E.g., State v. Wright, 40-0945 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 5/19/06); 931 So. 2d 432, 443 (ruling that Louisiana’s video voyeurism
statute “is not overbroad because the challenged statute affects conduct rather than
speech”); John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2008)
(“[Constitutionally protected] communication occurs [only] when Person A tries to
convey a thought—some idea or feeling—to Person B, and Person B can freely choose
whether to accept that thought.”); McClurg, supra note 55, at 995 n.22 (claiming
that “the tort of intrusion . . . does not directly implicate the First Amendment because it focuses upon the manner in which information is acquired, rather than the
dissemination of such information”).
140
D’Amario v. Providence Civic Ctr. Auth., 639 F. Supp. 1538, 1541 (D.R.I. 1986),
aff’d without opinion, 815 F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Jones v. Lakeview Sch. Dist.,
No. 06-0630, 2007 WL 2084341, at *7 (N.D. Ohio July 19, 2007) (ruling that taking pictures on school property “does not partake of the attributes of expression; it is conduct
pure and simple” (quoting S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cnty., No. 042329, 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 40027, at *10 (N.D. Ohio June 16, 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Porat v. Lincoln Towers Cnty. Ass’n, No. 04-3199, 2005 WL
646093, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2005) (denying protection to “purely private recreational, non-communicative photography” taken for photographer’s personal use),
aff’d, 464 F.3d 274 (2d Cir. 2006).
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pressed. . . . [I]f either is lacking, there is absolutely nothing to trans141
mit ‘from mind to mind.’”
So, too, a thoughtful Third Circuit judge limited protection of
video recording, noting that the plaintiff “does not allege the [defendant] Township interfered with its speech or other expressive activity.
Rather, the alleged constitutional violation consisted of a restriction
142
on [plaintiff’s] right to receive and record information.”
To be sure, one element of the freedom of expression that the First
Amendment protects is the opportunity to communicate ideas, emotions, experiences, and information to an audience. On analysis, however, the claim that image capture falls outside the First Amendment
because it collects rather than disseminates information runs aground.
1. Image Capture, Broadcast, and Technological Fortuity
In the emerging environment of pervasive image capture, the difference between capturing images and disseminating images erodes
rapidly. Even for skeptics who insist on an audience as a condition of
First Amendment protection, images which are immediately disseminated upon capture (as in live video broadcasting) constitute “speech.”
The same would presumably be true in the case of an image imme143
diately conveyed to a single recipient. As I have noted, sharing quotidian images with friends is an increasingly common use of cell phone
cameras, and contemporary technology makes it both possible and attractive for cell phone users to upload images immediately and auto144
matically upon capture to websites accessible to friends and family.
141

Montefusco v. Nassau Cnty., 39 F. Supp. 2d 231, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 1999).
143
See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (“It is true that the delivery of a tape recording might be regarded as conduct, but given that the purpose of
such a delivery is to provide the recipient with the text of recorded statements, it is like
the delivery of a handbill or a pamphlet, and as such, it is the kind of ‘speech’ that the
First Amendment protects.”); id. at 533 (recognizing a First Amendment interest in
avoiding chilling private conversations); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (recognizing a First Amendment interest in private papers
and letters); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974) (“The wife of a prison
inmate who is not permitted to read all that her husband wanted to say to her has suffered an abridgment of her interest in communicating with him as plain as that which
results from censorship of her letter to him.”), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (holding
that seizure of books and private correspondence is subject to stringent review rooted
in First Amendment protection).
144
See, e.g., Help, FLIXWAGON, http://www.flixwagon.com/help/index#a1 (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (“Flixwagon is a mobile phone and web application that allows us142
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For audience skeptics, this presumably would suffice to constitute
“speech” transmitted “from mind to mind.” Yet it puts undue weight
on technological fortuity to distinguish for First Amendment purposes
between users who upload their images immediately and automatically, and those who either by choice or because of technological limits
pause to edit their captured images before posting them on websites
or sending them to correspondents.
We would recognize police seizure of, or prosecution for, drafts of
letters or manuscripts as an interference with freedom of expression,
even if the seizure occurred before the writer had decided to send or
publish them, though no designated “audience” had been deprived of
their content. So, too, image capture before the decision to transmit
145
images falls within the scope of the emerging medium. Indeed, the
act of delaying publication in order to edit the stream of images seems
more manifestly a part of protected expression than the act of auto146
matically disseminating images wholesale.
2. Diaries, Internal Dialogue, and Memory
It is simply not the case, moreover, that an external audience is or
should be a necessary condition of First Amendment protection. The
reversal of Robert Stanley’s conviction for possession of three reels of
film containing images deemed obscene by the State of Georgia rested
not on any plans to convey the film to other audiences, but on Stanley’s personal right “to read or observe what he pleases . . . in the pri147
vacy of his own home.”
Had he recorded the material himself, the
result would have been no different.
ers to broadcast and share live videos from their mobile phones to the [I]nternet.”);
Photocopter, NTELOS WIRELESS, http://www.nteloswireless.com/popups/photocopter.
php (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (“Photocopter saves all your pictures to your PC and
web albums instantly.”); Qik Overview, QIK, http://qik.com/info/overview (last visited
Oct. 15, 2010) (allowing users to “[c]apture special or spontaneous moments on video
using your mobile phone” and to “[s]hare the moments live or anytime later with
anyone you choose”); Robin Wauters, ImageShack Updates iPhone App with Powerful
Photo, Video Sharing Options, TECHCRUNCH ( Jan. 12, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/
2010/01/12/imageshack-uploader-iphone-app (describing an iPhone application with
capacity to share directly to YouTube and Twitter in real time).
145
Cf. Zimmerman, supra note 76, at 1208-09 & 1208 n.106 (comparing modern
note-taking tools—tape recorders and video cameras—to traditional paper and pen,
and suggesting that paper notes are likely to be protected under the First Amendment).
146
Cf. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547-48 (noting that “compilation of pure fact[]
entails originality”).
147
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969); see also United States v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008) (“[W]e have held that the government may . . . not criminal-
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It is plain that a statute punishing me when I make an entry in my
diary, draft a “memorandum to file,” or put an innocuous picture in
my scrapbook would violate the First Amendment. A diary entry begins a process of communicating with an audience of one: my entries
are subject to review by my future self. Analogously, many contempo148
rary cell phone users capture images with an eye to future review.
Diaries of words or images need not communicate with outsiders
149
to merit constitutional protection under the First Amendment.
From the time that it began to incorporate the First Amendment as a
protection against state actions, the Court has recognized that the
Amendment’s principles extend to thought and speech—not to
speech alone—observing that “freedom of thought, and speech [constitute] . . . the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every
150
other form of freedom.” Nor has the Court abandoned the position
in recent years. While continuing to recognize the importance of the
First Amendment’s function in protecting communication with audiences, the Court has avowed that “freedom of thought and expression ‘includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain

ize the mere possession of obscene material involving adults.”); United States v. Reidel,
402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971) (refusing to extend First Amendment protection to distribute
obscene materials: “The focus of [Stanley] was on freedom of mind and thought and
on the privacy of one’s home.”).
148
See supra Section II.A and note 18.
149
See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 51-54 (1989) (arguing that defining “protected acts of expression” as “acts intended to communicate” is
inadequate, as not all speech is intended for an outside audience (emphasis omitted)); cf.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559 (concluding that the First Amendment shields “a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom
of speech in its affirmative aspect” (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc.,
244 N.E. 2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
150
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937), overruled on other grounds by
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) and quoted with approval in Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986); see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought
of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”); Schneider v. Smith, 390
U.S. 17, 25 (1968) (“[The First Amendment] create[s] a preserve where the views of
the individual are made inviolate.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)
(“The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to
print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of
inquiry, freedom of thought . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[I]f there is any
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought . . . .”), overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328
U.S. 61 (1946).
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151

from speaking at all.’”
The Court has twice affirmed that “[a]t the
heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person
should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of
152
expression, consideration, and adherence.”
Speech is protected not simply as a way of communicating with
others, but as a means of defining the speaker’s thoughts, intellect,
and memories. As Justice Kennedy observed, “[t]he right to think is
the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the
153
government because speech is the beginning of thought.”
The government is barred from intermeddling in both speech and
thought because both undergird the constitutional commitments to
154
personal autonomy and popular sovereignty. It is not uncommon to
find one’s thoughts clarified or indeed formed by the process of writing
155
So, too, the capture of images can effectively fix thoughts in
them.
156
the mental universe and make them available for future reflection. It
is as much an interference with freedom of thought to punish solitary
speech as it is to punish communication to an audience.
If the government were to be magically endowed with the capacity
to prevent the retention of solitary memories in the fashion of the
157
neuralizer in the film Men in Black, the exercise of that capacity
151

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714
(1977)); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“The First Amendment
securely protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech . . . .”).
152
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994), quoted with approval in
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression,
and certain intimate conduct.”).
153
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002); cf. ANDY CLARK, SUPERSIZING THE MIND 58 (2008) (“[A]s soon as we formulate a thought in words or on paper, it becomes an object, for both ourselves and for others . . . the kind of things we
can have thoughts about.”).
154
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to
make men free to develop their faculties . . . . They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread
of political truth . . . .”), overruled in part on other grounds by Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1967) (per curiam) and quoted with approval in Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 660-61 (2000).
155
See E.M. FORSTER, ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL 43 (1927) (“‘How can I tell what I
think till I see what I say?’”), cited in Adam Phillips, On What We Need: A Celebration of the
Work of Emmanuel Ghant, 11 PSYCHOLANALYTIC DIALOGUES 1, 6 (2001).
156
See VAN DIJCK, supra note 19, at 148-69 (discussing the implications of technology with increased memory capacity on the preservation and accessibility of prior
experiences).
157
MEN IN BLACK (Columbia Pictures 1997).
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would manifestly violate the “freedom of thought” guaranteed by the
158
First Amendment although no audience would be involved.
No
159
But memories recorded externally are vulsuch device exists, yet.
160
nerable to legal and technological interference.
When an individual records her sense impressions or draws
sketches in her diary, she constructs the scaffolding of her future
thoughts much as interior memories construct the scaffolding of cog161
nition. The same is true of captured images.
Human brains are
adapted to use physical phenomena as “external storage” to simplify
cognitive tasks, and regular consultation of and reliance on notes or
diaries are sensibly considered elements of an extended cognitive sys162
tem. Recorded images can serve the same function. Indeed, there
are reports of the use of photographic “life logs” by Alzheimer’s pa163
tients as prosthetic memories to retain a sense of their identity.

158

See, e.g., Charles Fried, Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Lecture, Perfect Freedom,
Perfect Justice, 78 B.U. L. REV. 717, 735 (1998) (“[T]he First Amendment as freedom of
thought . . . protects against government interfering with the process of judgment itself . . . .”); Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1989) (describing the Supreme Court’s
use of the First Amendment to protect freedom of thought).
159
But cf. Adam Kolber, Freedom of Memory Today, 1 NEUROETHICS 145, 145-47
(2008) (describing memory-erasing effects of drugs, including one anesthetic—
propofol—that “frequently ‘erases’ the patient’s memory of events that precede injection by a few minutes”); Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561, 1562 (2006) (“While true memory erasure is still the domain of science fiction, less dramatic means of dampening the
strength of a memory may have already been developed.” (footnote omitted)).
160
Cf. Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics from Kindle. (One is ‘1984’), N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 2009, at B1 (describing how Amazon.com “remotely deleted” digital editions of
two books from the electronic readers on which customers were storing them).
161
To be sure, sketching and diary entry involve the reduction of sense to symbol
but image capture does not. But if an audience is involved, captured images fall within
the ambit of the First Amendment. See supra Section V.A; cf. L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo,
973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing prior court rulings that have held that
photographs express authorship sufficiently to warrant copyright); Jewelers’ Circular
Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that photographs can be copyrighted “because no photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author” (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903))), aff’d, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922).
162
See CLARK, supra note 153, at 21 (discussing use of “the world as external storage”); id. at 41 (noting how the brain uses “environmental structure” and “cognitive
artifacts” equivalently to internal storage); id. at 76-78 (discussing how externally recorded memories function as an element of cognition); id. at 104-09 (arguing for a
“cognitive extension” view that considers the brain and external artifacts to be part of a
single system).
163
VAN DIJK, supra note 19, at 58-60.
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Pervasive image capture allows individuals to record memories.
Legal interference with recording abridges such individuals’ freedom
to reflect effectively on those experiences, truncating the freedom of
164
thought that the principles of the First Amendment guarantee.
3. Preconditions and Elements of Communication
Beyond these nonaudience-based roles, the modern process of
image capture is an essential element in producing, and ultimately
disseminating, photos, videos, and montages which modern First
Amendment doctrine solidly recognizes as protected media of communication. The increasing integration of image capture with communication devices ranging from cell phones to iPhones to PDAs
makes it clear that contemporary image capture is part of a broader
digital ecology of communication. One might try to dissect the medium into its component acts of image acquisition, recording, and dissemination and conclude that recording is an unprotected “act” without an audience.
But this maneuver is as inappropriate as
maintaining that the purchase of stationery or the application of ink
to paper are “acts” and therefore outside of the aegis of the First
Amendment.
Paint can be an essential precondition to artistic endeavor; a prohibition on the possession of aerosol spray paint cans was invalidated
on First Amendment grounds at the instance of artists who sought to
165
“create graffiti art in lawful venues on lawful surfaces.” And though
not without controversy, there is wide support for the proposition that
reproducing copyrighted images and materials as part of the process

164

In the machinations surrounding the Global War on Terror, one clear effect of
the rules that precluded legislators from recording the details of the programs to
which they were exposed was to make it more difficult to reflect effectively on the information. See Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Varied Rationales Muddle Issue of NSA Eavesdropping, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2006, at A5 (reporting on rules barring legislators from
taking notes on briefings regarding an NSA warrantless-surveillance program); cf.
United States v. Cabra, 622 F.2d 182, 184-85 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the district
court’s prohibition on in-courtroom note-taking was an abuse of discretion); Goldschmidt v. Coco, 413 F. Supp. 2d 949, 952-53 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“A sweeping prohibition
of all note-taking by any outside party seems unlikely to withstand a challenge under
the First Amendment.”).
165
Vincenty v. Bloomberg, 476 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2007); see also United States v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir. 1974) (concluding that sketching in the courtroom is protected by the First Amendment and that a “total ban” on
the publication of such sketches is “too broad to withstand constitutional scrutiny”).
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of personal use in production of subsequent authorial works is pro166
tected by the First Amendment.
Dean Robert Post has noted: “If the state were to prohibit the use
of [film] projectors without a license, First Amendment coverage
would undoubtedly be triggered. This is not because projectors constitute speech acts, but because they are integral to the forms of inte167
raction that comprise the genre of the cinema.”
The point holds
beyond the physical links in the chain of communication. Almost
all media of expression can be broken down into a series of social
practices and preconditions that are not themselves expressive. Justice Scalia has observed:
In any economy operated on even the most rudimentary principles
of division of labor, effective public communication requires the speaker
to make use of the services of others. An author may write a novel, but
he will seldom publish and distribute it himself. A freelance reporter
may write a story, but he will rarely edit, print, and deliver it to subscribers. To a government bent on suppressing speech, this mode of organi-

166

See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir.
2007) (discussing Perfect 10’s claim that “users who link to infringing websites automatically make ‘cache’ copies of full-size images” and reasoning that “even assuming
such automatic copying could constitute direct infringement, it is a fair use”); Duffy v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that where
an author photocopied a portion of a copyrighted work in the course of her research,
the photocopying amounted to fair use and was immune to copyright claims). The
Court has suggested that the fair use defense in copyright cases is required by the First
Amendment. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-21 (2003).
An array of commentators argue that copying for personal use or as part of authorial transformation to a new work is constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1198-1205
(2007); Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1897-1903 (2007);
Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 545-57 (2004). But see David McGowan, Some
Realism About the Free-Speech Critique of Copyright, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 454 (2005)
(“To the extent the law treats people as so dependent on culture that they cannot
speak without copying, the law has less reason to respect what people say as reflecting a
preference of their own.”).
167
Post, Encryption, supra note 125, at 717; cf. Zimmerman, supra note 76, at 1209
(“The method and the result do not segment . . . conveniently into discrete parts.”).
The Court has put the matter in similar terms. First Amendment scrutiny applies
to statutes “based on a nonexpressive activity [that] has the inevitable effect of singling
out those engaged in expressive activity” or to sanctions against activity “intimately related to expressive conduct protected under the First Amendment.” Arcara v. Cloud
Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 n.3, 706-07 (1986). See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514, 527 (2001) (“[D]elivery of a tape recording might be regarded as conduct, but
given that the purpose of such a delivery is to provide the recipient with the text of
recorded statements, it is like the delivery of a handbill or a pamphlet, and as such, it is
the kind of ‘speech’ that the First Amendment protects.”).
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zation presents opportunities: Control any cog in the machine, and you
can halt the whole apparatus. . . . The right to speak would be largely ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in financial transactions
168
that are the incidents of its exercise.

Targeting image capture can provide a similarly effective means
for censoring the protected flow of images into public and private discourse. The typical police officer, plaintiff, or complainant in the
image-capture cases canvassed above is not concerned with avoiding
observation or preserving seclusion simplicter. She is interested, rather, in assuring that evidence of dubious or potentially embarrassing
actions is not credibly conveyed by the observer to a wider audience by
transmission of the captured image. There are few cases on record of
police officers arresting tourists who capture videos of polite official
responses to inquiries for directions. Prohibitions on image capture
169
are deployed to suppress inconvenient truths.
It is precisely this suppression at which the First Amendment is directed. First Amendment doctrine regularly disapproves of legal rules
that vest officials with unbridled discretion, because officials are likely
to bring legal sanctions to suppress communications they find uncon170
genial. Broad and malleable prohibitions on image capture are well
168

McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 251-52 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see also Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1982) (finding that disclosure of unpopular minor-party
disbursements could cripple the party’s viability because those who provide “services
rendered scarce by public hostility and suspicion . . . would be . . . vulnerable to
threats, harassment, and reprisals . . . and those seeking to harass may disrupt commercial activities on the basis of expenditure information”).
Justice Scalia wrote in partial dissent in McConnell, but his analysis was adopted
by the majority in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. at 898. See
also id. (“Government could repress speech by silencing certain voices at any of the
various points in the speech process.” (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 251 (opinion of
Scalia, J.))).
169
The 9/11 security cases are only partial exceptions. There is nothing embarrassing about Amtrak trains, but the motivating concern still seems to be the prevention of the transmission of images to notional terrorists.
170
See, e.g., Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) (finding that concern with officials “encouraging some views and discouraging others” requires the rule that “[t]he First Amendment prohibits the vesting of such unbridled
discretion in a government official”); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051
(1991) (“The prohibition against vague regulations of speech is based in part on the
need to eliminate the impermissible risk of discriminatory enforcement, for history
shows that speech is suppressed when either the speaker or the message is critical of
those who enforce the law.” (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 361
(1983) and Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974)); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990) (“[A] scheme that places ‘unbridled discretion in
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adapted to this end. Justice Scalia’s observation regarding the vulnerability of “cogs in the machine” was made in dissent, but Supreme
Court majorities have regularly invoked the First Amendment to invalidate regulations that impose burdens on “actions” without audiences
where the targets are essential preconditions to communication.
The point is clear with regard to “actions” involved in the chain of
distribution: to forbid handing out leaflets that may end up as litter,
placing newsracks on public property, or distributing books to stores
may violate the First Amendment, even if drafting, printing, and read171
ing are left undisturbed. But the Court has also struck down regulations that target component “actions” that precede the chain of connection between speaker and audience.
The Court has invalidated the impositions of taxes on ink and paper
172
used in publications, as well as taxes imposed on advertising revenue.
It struck down a statute that forbade publishers to pay authors writing
173
Although the statute
about crimes in which they had participated.
precluded payment rather than either authorship or publication,
Whether the First Amendment ‘speaker’ is considered to be [the author], whose income the statute places in escrow because of the story he
has told, or Simon & Schuster, which can publish books about crime
with the assistance of only those criminals willing to forgo remuneration

the hands of a government official or agency . . . may result in censorship.’” (quoting
City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, (1988))); City of Houston v.
Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 453, 471-72 (1987) (finding a “municipal ordinance that makes it
unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the performance of his or her duties” to be
“unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment”); Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (holding unconstitutional a standardless city ordinance prohibiting the use of sound amplification devices without permission of the chief of police).
171
E.g., Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 762-72 (newsracks); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 65 n.6 (1963) (circulation of books); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943) (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939)) (literature distribution despite potential for litter); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc.
v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165-66 (2002) (protecting the right to canvass door-todoor under the First Amendment).
For analysis of the ways in which burdens on intermediaries interfere with constitutionally protected speech, see Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment,
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006).
172
See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
592-93 (1983) (invalidating a tax on ink and paper used in producing publications);
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-51 (1936) (invalidating a tax on newspaper advertisements).
173
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 116 (1991).
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for at least five years, the statute plainly imposes a financial disincen174
tive . . . on speech . . . .

The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding a statute that
precluded members of the federal civil service from receiving payment
for writing or speaking engagements, stating that although the statute
neither prohibits any speech nor discriminates among speakers based
on the content or viewpoint of their messages, its prohibition on compensation unquestionably imposes a significant burden on expressive
activity. . . .
The large-scale disincentive to Government employees’ expression also imposes a significant burden on the public’s right to read and hear
175
what the employees would otherwise have written and said.

Furthermore, the Court has recognized that group association is
often a precondition for “‘[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones,’” and has extended
First Amendment protection to the “act” of association as a way of
176
making the “speech” of members effective. Indeed, the Court recognized that privacy may, in turn, be necessary to association; it has protected the “acts” of refusing to disclose the membership lists of political
177
organizations on First Amendment grounds.
Image capture is a precondition for effective participation in the
contemporary visual ecology of communication. To post an image
from life on Flickr, YouTube, or one’s own blog, or to send it to a
friend by text message or e-mail, one must first capture the image. A
prohibition on image capture is effectively a prohibition on the practice of sharing spontaneous images from life. As Professor Smolla observes, to prohibit capture of public images without consent would
violate the First Amendment because it “would cripple communica-

174

Id.
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468, 470 (1995).
176
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982) (quoting NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)); see also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for
Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (noting the “importance of
freedom of association in guaranteeing the right of people to make their voices heard
on public issues”).
177
See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 558 (1963)
(finding unconstitutional a legislative inquiry into the membership list of the NAACP);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960) (holding unconstitutional a state statute requiring teachers to disclose all organizations to which they belong); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. at 462-63 (determining that forced disclosure of membership lists of
an organization engaged in advocacy is unconstitutional).
175
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tion and expression . . . [and it] would effectively give to the actors in
178
human events a quality of ownership over news and history itself.”
Two final reasons caution against placing image capture beyond
the protection of the First Amendment. First, images are often more
salient than verbal descriptions. Their apparently self-authenticating
character gives them disparate authority, and their rhetorical impact
encompasses the proverbial “thousand words.” Participants in public
dialogue who are barred from capturing images are at a substantial
discursive disadvantage vis-à-vis those who can record from life. Officials engage in virtually unchecked surveillance of public encounters.
A rule that bars citizens from capturing images gives unbalanced authority to official framing.
Second, in the modern environment, the marginal cost of the
physical composition and transmission of speech has dropped to close
to zero; the limiting factor of public discourse is the cost of acquiring
the information to disseminate. In such an environment, courts
should be particularly reluctant to expand doctrines that allow the
state or aggressive plaintiffs to raise selectively the cost of acquiring
inconvenient images.
VI. THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION FOR IMAGE CAPTURE
That image capture falls within the ambit of First Amendment
protection does not establish the degree of that protection. A final set
of skeptics acknowledges that image capture implicates First Amendment principles but maintains that those principles permit its broad
regulation. Some invoke the proposition that constitutionally recognized expression rights do not supersede “generally applicable” rules
179
Others maintain that the expresof tort, contract, or criminal law.
sive interests in image capture are counterbalanced by the importance
180
of protecting competing interests in privacy or public security. Nei-

178

Smolla, supra note 114, at 1128.
See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (“The First
Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into
the precincts of another’s home or office.”); Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy
and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1173-74, 1186-87 (2005) (arguing that
rules of “general applicability” do not “fall within the scope of the First Amendment”); see
also Mishra, supra note 81, at 1551 (“[T]he Amendment does not excuse citizens from
state liability for recording police, even where citizens allege police misconduct.”).
180
See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 983-84 (2003) (arguing that, in balancing freedom
of speech against other interests, not all forms of speech are valued as highly as privacy).
179
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ther of these arguments warrants broadly exempting prohibitions of
image capture from First Amendment scrutiny.
A. “Generally Applicable Laws” and the Right to Gather Information
Individual Justices have regularly argued in dissent that the First
Amendment requires effective accommodations by the government to
provide access to information necessary for informed discussion of
181
The Court’s majority, however, has rejected an unpublic affairs.
adorned First Amendment “right to gather information” that supersedes other legal obligations.
The tone was set in 1965 in Zemel v. Rusk, in which the Court rejected a claim that the denial of a passport to travel to Cuba interfered
with the plaintiffs’ claimed First Amendment right to gather information. The Court commented:
There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the
prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the
citizen’s opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to
his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make
entry into the White House a First Amendment right. The right to speak
and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather in182
formation.
181

Justice Stevens, for instance, made this argument in his dissent in Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court:
I have long believed that a proper construction of the First Amendment
embraces a right of access to information about the conduct of public affairs.
“As Madison wrote:
“‘A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy . . . .’”
478 U.S. 1, 18 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910)); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The theme has been sounded as well by Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584-89 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Justice
Powell in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); Justice Douglas in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 839-842 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); and Justice Stewart in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 (1972) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
182
381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612-14 (1999)
(holding that media “ride-alongs” could not constitutionally accompany search of a
private home); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691 (“It would be frivolous to assert . . . that the
First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on
either the reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws.”), quoted with approval in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 n.19 (2001); cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel,
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The Court has rejected efforts by media plaintiffs to require prisons to make exceptions to regulations governing prison visits in order
to allow interviews of designated inmates or to gain access to prisons
to videotape the facilities, declaring that, while “[t]here is an undoubted right to gather news ‘from any source by means within the
law,’ . . . that affords no basis for the claim that the First Amendment
compels others—private persons or governments—to supply informa183
tion.” The Court has recognized a limited First Amendment right of
184
access to public trials and proceedings. But it has held that the government is under no obligation to provide copies of tape recordings
185
186
entered into evidence or of arrest records in its control.

408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972) (upholding denial of entry to a foreign speaker invited to
academic conferences on grounds of foreign affairs power).
183
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11 (plurality opinion) (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 68182); see also id. at 15 (noting that the First Amendment does not mandate “a right of
access to government information or sources of information within the government’s
control”); Pell, 417 U.S. at 834 (denying media plaintiffs access to interview particular
inmates); Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 849-50 (holding that prohibiting interviews of particular
inmates does not violate the First Amendment).
Pell and Saxbe were 5-4 decisions. Due to recusals in Houchins, Chief Justice Burger’s plurality spoke for only himself and two others. Justice Stevens was joined by two
Justices in dissent. Justice Stewart’s concurrence in the judgment, which was necessary
to form a majority, rejected a categorical “right of access to information generated or
controlled by government.” Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16. But Justice Stewart also determined that, since the public was granted personal access to prison tours, the First
Amendment required that media visitors be allowed to bring “cameras and recording
equipment for effective presentation to the viewing public.” Id. at 18. Although Justice Stewart’s opinion is technically determinative, many subsequent cases and commentators have treated the plurality as stating the law. See e.g., L.A. Police Dep’t v.
United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 411 n.10 (1989).
184
E.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986); PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 501-05 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 581 (plurality opinion). The Court has not, however, recognized a right to photograph trials that are required to be open to the public. Cf. Chandler v. Florida, 449
U.S. 560, 574-75 (1981) (acknowledging that the television broadcast of a trial may sometimes violate due process but declining to adopt an absolute ban on coverage); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534-35 (1965) (holding that televising trial proceedings infringed on
the right to a fair trial); In re Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 564 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2009) (limiting webcasts of civil nonevidentiary motion hearings); Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675,
679-80 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that “the Media Policy banning the use of video cameras
and other cameras in the execution chamber does not burden any of [Plaintiff’s] First
Amendment rights” and citing other relevant cases for support).
185
See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (rejecting a
claim that “copies of the White House tapes-—to which the public has never had physical access-—must be made available for copying”).
186
See United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. at 40 (“This is not a case in which the
government is prohibiting a speaker from conveying information that the speaker al-
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The Court rebuffed an argument that a First Amendment right to
gather information required an exception to the law of promissory estoppel where a newspaper published the name of a source to whom it
had promised confidentiality. The majority in Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co. declared:
[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news. . . . The press may not with impunity break and enter an office or dwelling to gather news. . . . “The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of
187
general laws.”

Citing these cases, some commentators maintain that because
prohibitions on recording of information are “generally applicable,”
188
This is not, and should
they raise no First Amendment concerns.
not be, the law. To derive the claim that every “generally applicable”
limit on the flow of information is immune from First Amendment
scrutiny is to detach the decided cases from the facts and principles in
which they are rooted.
The Court’s cases reject a claimed right to “compel[] others . . . to
189
supply information.”
They deny an “unrestrained right to gather”
information by engaging in conduct beyond mere inquiry or observa190
tion. But prohibiting the capture of images that photographers can
observe with their own eyes and ears does not protect against “compelled” disclosure of information; rather, it prohibits recording information that has already been voluntarily released. A statute that
forbade reporters from interviewing sources or observing public activities and recording their notes would manifestly violate First Amend-

ready possesses. . . . California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all
without violating the First Amendment.”).
187
501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103,
132 (1937)).
188
See, e.g., Richards, supra note 179, at 1187-90. To be fair, Professor Richards
acknowledges that “[o]ne can imagine science fiction-style hypotheticals that would
bring information collection rules within [First Amendment protection]—for example, a law forbidding the keeping of records or outlawing cameras.” Id. at 1189. It may
be that reality is overtaking science fiction.
189
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (plurality opinion); see also Fla.
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989) (“To the extent sensitive information rests in
private hands, the government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acquisition . . . .”).
190
See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (“The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”); see also Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 683-85 (1972) (listing limitations on news gathering).
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191

ment constraints.
Given the role that image capture plays in the
emerging ecology of digital visual communication, the effect of blanket prohibitions on image capture raises similar concerns.
Prohibitions of image capture are not directed against the “gathering” of information from unwilling sources; they bar the act of recording for future review impressions already gathered by observers.
The exemption of “generally applicable” regulations from First
Amendment scrutiny does not extend to regulations that have “the
inevitable effect of singling out those engaged in expressive activity”
or rules that prohibit activity “intimately related to expressive conduct
192
Image capture is such an
protected under the First Amendment.”
activity. Laws that prohibit the capture of images by definition interfere with the individual practice of preserving experience for future

191

See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1979) (“[R]espondents
relied upon routine newspaper reporting techniques . . . . A free press cannot be made
to rely solely upon the sufferance of government to supply it with information.”);
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (“[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”); cf. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11 (recognizing “a
First Amendment right to receive letters from inmates criticizing jail officials and reporting on conditions,” “to interview those who render the legal assistance to which
inmates are entitled,” and “to seek out former inmates, visitors to the prison, public
officials, and institutional personnel”) (citations omitted)).
192
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 n.3, 707 (1986); see also Turner
Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) (plurality opinion) (discussing the
danger of laws that “single out the press” in justifying heightened scrutiny).
Since Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), the Court has recognized
that, in prosecuting groups’ efforts to instruct “terrorist organizations” in humanitarian law, a “generally applicable” prohibition of “material support” raises First
Amendment issues. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722-30
(2010). It applied First Amendment scrutiny, albeit of a more forgiving variety, to
“generally applicable” prohibitions of public nudity applied to erotic dancing. City of
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 296 (2000) (plurality opinion); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571-72 (1991) (plurality opinion). And it rejected the
proposition that the “generally applicable” copyright system was “‘categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.’” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
221 (2003) (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); see also BE&K
Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 522, 524 (2002) (holding that the First Amendment
prohibited sanction of employers for violating the National Labor Relation Act’s “generally applicable” prohibition on “restraining, coercing, or interfering with employees’
exercise of rights related to self-organization” by bringing a lawsuit (citing the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (2000)).
Indeed, as Professor Volokh has noted, many of the classic First Amendment cases
from Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204
(1919), and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), through Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971) involved “generally applicable” criminal statutes applied to speech. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1287-94 (2005).
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review, reflection, and expression—a practice that is entitled to protection under the First Amendment.
Bartnicki v. Vopper illustrates the point. In Bartnicki, the Court reviewed application of a statute that imposed liability for “disclosure” of
193
the contents of an illegally intercepted wire or oral communication.
The Court concluded that the statute “is in fact a content-neutral law
194
of general applicability.” But rather than forgoing First Amendment
review, it went on to find that the prohibition on disclosure violated
the First Amendment as applied both to a radio commentator who
broadcasted the contents of a telephone conversation intercepted by
an anonymous source, and to the citizen who received the recording
195
The Court
from that source and conveyed it to the commentator.
assumed that the act of “obtaining the relevant information unlawfully”
196
could be subject to sanction, but it determined that “the naked prohibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of
197
As a “regulation of pure speech”—applicable by its
pure speech.”
terms against recognized media of expression—it was subject to the
First Amendment precept that publication of “‘lawfully obtain[ed]
truthful information about a matter of public significance’” may not
198
The Court
be punished “‘absent a need . . . of the highest order.’”
weighed the interests advanced by the prohibition and ultimately
found them wanting.
Legal interventions that target image capture go beyond protection against “compelling” unwilling parties to “supply” information.
The images in question have already been “supplied” to the observer
who seeks to record them, and indeed, in many cases, to the world at
large. Emerging efforts to constrain image capture do not target actions collateral to expression—they sanction the disposition of information itself. Like prohibitions on sketching, taking notes, or memorializing observations in a diary, they bar individuals who have already
193

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517 (2001). The statutes at issue were 18
U.S.C. § 2511 (2000) and 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5725(a) (2000).
194
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526.
195
Id. at 526-27.
196
Id. at 532 n.19.
197
Id. at 526; see also id. at 527 (reasoning that the relevant subsection of the
federal statute was “not a regulation of conduct”); id. at 527 n.11 (“[W]hat gave rise
to . . . liability . . . was the information communicated on the tapes”); id. at 530 n.13
(distinguishing “mail theft and stolen property,” which do not “involve prohibitions
on speech”).
198
Id. at 528 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443
U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
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acquired information from preserving it for future review, reflection,
and dissemination. As such, they are not “generally applicable” regulations of conduct that adventitiously interfere with speech; rather
they are targeted regulations in which the very definition of violation
involves interference with a medium of expression. They are fully subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment.
B. Image Capture, Privacy, and First Amendment Limits
To conclude that the constraints on image capture are not “generally applicable” laws free of First Amendment scrutiny, of course,
does not establish that they are invalid. A final set of commentators
maintains that despite incursions on the exercise of free expression,
efforts to protect privacy by precluding image capture invoke suffi199
ciently weighty interests to overcome First Amendment constraints.
The Court has carefully avoided broad resolution of the balance
200
between claims of privacy and the interests of free speech. Nor has
the Court directly addressed the more precise First Amendment status
201
of image capture. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court stated that the interest in privacy supported punishing “private wiretapping” which “ob202
tain[ed] . . . information unlawfully.” But it wrote narrowly, limiting
203
its discussion to the particular facts presented.
Nonetheless, guidelines emerge from more general First Amendment principles. The Court has upheld rules that constrain expression
199

E.g., Solove, supra note 180, at 983-94, 1028-29.
See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530, 533 (1989) (“[T]he sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy
rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.”). In Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533
(2001), the Court approved the approach of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88
(1967), which “reserve[ed] the question whether truthful publication of private matters unrelated to public affairs can be constitutionally proscribed.”
201
Cf. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 156 (2004) (declining to reach First
Amendment claims on procedural grounds); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40
(1965) (discussing freedom of the press to access court proceedings without discussing
the act of filming).
202
532 U.S. at 532 n.19 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972));
see also id. at 529 (“We assume that those interests adequately justify the prohibition . . . against the interceptor’s own use of information that he or she acquired by
violating [the wiretapping statute].”); cf. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 534 (“To the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the government may under some circumstances
forbid its nonconsensual acquisition . . . .”).
203
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (“Our refusal to construe the issue presented more
broadly is consistent with the Court’s repeated refusal to answer categorically whether
truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment.”).
200
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in recognized media under doctrines of copyright, defamation, and obscenity, but it has imposed distinctive First Amendment limits on
204
each. So, too, image capture may be subject to constraints imposed to
vindicate weighty privacy interests, but only within the boundaries of
First Amendment principle and practice. Those boundaries substantially narrow the legitimate scope of prohibitions on image capture.
Three general principles set initial boundaries. First, where image
capture is regulated to protect privacy, the state cannot rely on inchoate invocations of that interest; a countervailing claim of privacy
must be firmly grounded in the facts of the case in which it is invoked.
Second, regulation must follow established legal rules that authoritatively recognize the scope of the privacy interest at stake and tailor the
response to meet concerns of constitutional magnitude. Catchall statutes and administrative retaliation invoked on the basis of standardless discretion do not meet this requirement. Nor do claims of streetlevel bureaucrats who maintain a right to discharge their duties in
public without being recorded, nor those of private parties who seek
to remove from the public domain images they have revealed to the
public gaze. Finally, where legal rules constraining image capture legitimately seek to protect the privacy of intimate venues, analysis of
the actual magnitude of the competing interests is required before
liability can be sustained.
1. Retaliation and Catchall Statutes
Where the government seeks to suppress image capture in the
interests of privacy, at a minimum the intervention must be framed
by legal rules that limit the intervention to the scope of an authoritatively defined public interest and that provide adequate standards
205
for official decision.
204

For copyright, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-21 (2003), and Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). For defamation, see
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 522-23 (1991), Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990), Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 763 (1985), and N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283-85 (1964). For
obscenity, see Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1974), and Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973). Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 383
(1992), which found that while obscenity and libel can be regulated, they are not “categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution.”
205
Cf. Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 536 (“Even assuming the Constitution permitted a State
to proscribe receipt of information, Florida has not taken this step.”); Miller, 413 U.S. at 2327 (holding that prohibitions of obscenity must involve images or descriptions of sexual
conduct “specifically defined by the applicable state law”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (finding that “in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define
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Obviously, raw exertion of official power does not meet this standard; use of official discretion to retaliate for the exercise of an activity
206
protected by the First Amendment is itself a constitutional violation.
Arrests in retaliation for image capture constitute violations of First
Amendment rights. This is no small point, for, as discussed in Section
III.C above, one growing source of litigation is the tendency of police
officers to arrest photographers on trumped-up charges both as a way of
preventing the spread of inconvenient truths and as a response to freefloating anxiety about individuals who remind officials of terrorists.
The constraints of First Amendment doctrine also preclude the
use of broadly worded statutes that give unbridled authority to law enforcement officers to sanction image capture. In City of Houston, Texas
v. Hill, the Court held that a statute that punished those who “oppose,
molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty”
could not be constitutionally applied to “verbal interruptions of police
207
officers.” Justice Brennan observed for the majority: “The Constitution does not allow such speech to be made a crime. The freedom of
individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we
208
distinguish a free nation from a police state.” Allowing statutes that
prohibit “interfering with an officer” or “disobeying an officer” to punish inconvenient image capture puts police officers in the constitutionally impermissible position of censoring critical expression with
209
unconstitutional impunity.
and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial
interest of the State,” the plaintiff could not be convicted of disturbing the peace).
206
See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (“Official reprisal for protected speech ‘offends the Constitution’ . . . and the law is settled that as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual
to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out.” (citations
omitted) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998))).
207
482 U.S. 451, 455, 461 (1987) (quoting Houston’s Code of Ordinances) (internal quotation marks omitted) .
208
Id. at 462-63 (footnote omitted).
209
See supra note 170 (citing examples of First Amendment strictures against vesting law enforcement officials with limitless discretion); cf. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S.
566, 572-73 (1974) (“[T]he due process doctrine of vagueness . . . requires legislatures
to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent ‘arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” (quoting Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972))); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (condemning delegation of “basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an
ad hoc and subjective basis” as “impermissibl[e]”); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558
(1965) (“[T]he practice . . . [of] allowing unfettered discretion in local officials in the
regulation of the use of the streets for peaceful parades and meetings” violates the First
Amendment.”); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308 (“[A] statute sweeping in a great variety of
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2. Torts and Statutes Protecting Privacy and Dignity
In contrast to cases of retaliation or catchall statutes, targeted legal rules that constrain image capture of intimate interactions potentially invoke justifications of constitutional magnitude. Again, Bart210
nicki v. Vopper is the most recent and illuminating case. Each of the
opinions in Bartnicki recognized the potential importance of privacy
of communication in “encouraging the uninhibited exchange of ideas
211
and information among private parties.” And each invoked privacy
212
as an “interest[] of the highest order.”
For the Bartnicki dissenters, the conjunction of these interests was
more than sufficient to survive First Amendment scrutiny. In Justice
Breyer’s determinative concurring opinion, the application of the
wiretap statutes required “a reasonable balance between their speechrestricting and speech-enhancing consequences” because “important
213
competing constitutional interests are implicated.”
For Justice
Breyer, “[a]s a general matter” that balance would sustain prohibitions on wiretapping against First Amendment attack, although “as
applied” to the republication at issue, the statutory prohibitions “do
214
not reasonably reconcile the competing constitutional objectives.”
Even the Bartnicki majority emphasized the “important interests to be
considered on both sides of the constitutional calculus” and left open
the possibility of sanctioning “most violations of the statute without of215
fending the First Amendment.”
These justifications often suffice to justify bans on peeping Toms
with cameras or surreptitious image capture of intimate conduct.

conduct under a general and indefinite characterization . . . [left] to the executive and
judicial branches too wide a discretion in its application.”).
210
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
211
Id. at 532 (quoting Brief for the United States at 27, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514
(Nos. 99-1687, 99-1728)); see also id. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that statutes that enhance privacy also “encourage conversations that otherwise might not take
place”); id. at 543, 547, 553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that privacy statutes
“further the First Amendment rights of the parties to the conversation”).
212
See id. at 518 (majority opinion); id. at 536, 538 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at
544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); cf. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989)
(“[P]ress freedom and privacy rights are both ‘plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society.’” (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Connecticut, 420 U.S.
469, 491 (1975))); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967) (discussing the conflict between the right of privacy and the rights of the press).
213
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
214
Id. at 537-38.
215
Id. at 533 (majority opinion).
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They are, however, inapplicable to many of the restraints on image
capture canvassed above.
a. Privacy, Dignity, and Public Officials
Officials who invoke protections for privacy to justify punishing
those who monitor public conduct mistake their own anxieties for
constitutional justification.
The privacy interests recognized in Bartnicki, like privacy interests
that many commentators argue counterbalance the interest in free
216
expression, guard free discourse by private citizens who use the shel217
ter of privacy to “think and act creatively and constructively.” When
privacy functions to underpin democratic society, the interests in free
expression may balance one another. Suppression of free expression
on the part of those who capture information may protect the freedom to converse of those whose words and images are captured.
But officers confronting demonstrators, motorists, or the subjects
of arrest—like other street-level bureaucrats providing services—
neither engage in dialogue by which they define their private identities nor in discourse that contributes to public deliberation. Many of
the official subjects of image capture are not engaged in discourse of
any sort. Those who speak do so not as autonomous citizens working
out their own thoughts and destiny, but as public servants carrying out
their duties. The Court recently emphasized that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes”
and can claim scant protection under guarantees of free expression
218
A fortiori, they can
designed to shield the discourse of citizens.
claim no compelling right as citizens to shield that speech from being
recorded. Nor can public actors claim a right to preserve their personal dignity against public inspection when they carry out their duties. Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Bartnicki that protections against wiretapping not only “encourage conversations that

216

See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 389 (2008)
(“The ability to freely make up our minds and to develop new ideas . . . depends upon
a substantial measure of intellectual privacy.”); Solove, supra note 180, at 990-97 (considering the effect of privacy on autonomy and “democratic self-governance”).
217
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533 (quoting THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 202
(1967) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 543 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (same).
218
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
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otherwise might not take place,” but they also protect opportunities
for intimacy: “[T]hey resemble laws that would award damages
caused through publication of information obtained by theft from a
219
A police officer investigating a crime can assert
private bedroom.”
no comparable right to intimacy with her suspects; still less can a pub220
Certainly, law
lic official engaged in her duties on a public street.
officials have no constitutionally cognizable or legitimate expectation
that their actions remain unrecorded; on the contrary, the actions of
221
public officials are by definition a matter of public concern.
b. Privacy and Dignity in the Public Sphere
The Supreme Court has suggested that the goal of protecting dignity and autonomy interests against intrusion justifies some limits on
free expression. Lower courts have upheld efforts to sanction nonconsensual image capture of private parties in intimate situations under both appropriately tailored video voyeurism statutes and privacy
222
torts against First Amendment challenges.
219

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 537 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“‘[A] law enforcement officer’s actions while performing his public duties . . . do not
fall within the activities to be protected under the Comment [h] to § 652D of Restatement (Second) of Torts as a matter of ‘personal privacy.’” (quoting Cowles Publ’g Co.
v. State Patrol, 748 P.2d 597, 605 (Wash. 1988))); Hornberger v. ABC, Inc., 799 A.2d
566, 594 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“[P]olice officers do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy when they are interacting with suspects.” (citing Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1993) and State v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1992))); cf. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 540 (“[T]he subject matter of the conversation at issue here is far removed from that in situations where the media publicizes truly private matters.”); Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[The]
interest in protecting private communication . . . is virtually irrelevant . . . where the
intercepted communications involve a search by police officers of a private citizen’s
home . . . .”).
The court in Commonwealth v. Hyde, which upheld a wiretap prosecution for recording a police encounter, concluded that no First Amendment values were implicated because “[t]he defendant was not prosecuted for making the recording; he was
prosecuted for doing so secretly.” 750 N.E.2d 963, 969 (Mass. 2001). That conclusion,
as argued above, is simply erroneous.
221
See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284, 289 (1971) (recognizing that a police
officer was a “public official” and holding that he was not entitled to damages for a
press report that failed to include qualifying statements about his “official conduct”).
222
Compare State v. Stevenson, 613 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Wis. 2000) (holding a video
voyeurism statute unconstitutionally overbroad), and State v. Glas, 54 P.3d 147, 153
(Wash. 2002) (en banc) (limiting a voyeurism statute to private places, because contrary construction “would sweep constitutionally protected conduct within the statute’s
penumbra because it could encompass simply looking at someone appreciatively or
desirously in a public place, such as a restaurant or a bar”), with State v. Townsend, No.
220
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But allowing criminal or tort actions in the case of dissemination
of a videotape of sexual assaults or intimate sexual interactions is a far
cry from banning spontaneous image capture by the holders of cell
phones in public venues or granting the subjects of such image capture broad authority to censor the memorialization of their images.
Extant tort doctrine requires as a general matter that image capture
constitute intrusion on “seclusion” or “private affairs or concerns” that
is “highly offensive to a reasonable person” before a plaintiff may re223
cover damages. Prevailing doctrine generally precludes recovery for
images captured in public, so long as the subjects of the images are
224
“exhibited to the public gaze.”
Once we recognize that image capture is protected by principles
of free expression, proposals to impose liability without observing the
established limitations of privacy torts-–either by common law innovation or by statute—raise serious constitutional questions. Such liability would facilitate interference with efforts by private individuals to
preserve their observations for future review, reflection, and dissemination without any actual demonstration to a court of substantial
225
countervailing privacy interests.

06-2637, 2007 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1007, at *5-6 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2007) (per curiam) (noting that the statute narrowed to covert depictions of nudity “while that person is nude in a circumstance in which he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy” survives First Amendment scrutiny (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.09(2)(am)(1)
(West 2008))) and Gilmer v. State, 244-KA-02236-SCT (¶ 29) (Miss. 2007) (declaring
that a voyeurism statute which bars recording a person without consent “with a lewd
intent . . . [in] a protected location” does not violate First Amendment).
For examples of cases upholding sanctions against intimate image capture, see supra note 58. See also Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g. Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1213 (11th Cir.
2009) (finding that the publication of nude photographs of a female wrestler in Hustler
after her sensational death did not qualify for the “newsworthiness exception to the
right of publicity”).
223
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
224
Id. at cmt. c (“Nor is there liability for observing him or even taking his photograph while he is walking on the public highway, since he is not then in seclusion, and
his appearance is public and open to the public eye . . . .”); cf. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551
U.S. 537, 553 (2007) (“The videotaping of ranch guests during the 2000 drive, while
no doubt thoroughly irritating and bad for business, may not have been unlawful, depending, among other things, upon the location on public or private land of the
people photographed.”); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala.
1964) (“One who is a part of a public scene may be lawfully photographed as an incidental part of that scene in his ordinary status.”).
225
See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989) (“Unlike claims based on the
common-law tort of invasion of privacy, civil actions based on [a Florida statute] require no case-by-case findings that the disclosure of a fact about a person’s private life
was one that a reasonable person would find highly offensive.” (citation omitted)).
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The exclusion of images “exhibited to the public gaze” from the
domain of the actionably private is no adventitious common law relic.
First, release of information is often plausibly taken to waive rights to
bar further dissemination. Cases that refuse to impose liability on image capture either civilly or criminally often emphasize that appearance in a public venue waives any legitimate expectation that one’s
226
image will remain private. The act of recording material available to
the naked eyes and ears—and, a fortiori, words spoken to the listener as
part of a conversation in public—cannot be said to involve the untoward acquisition of information by the observer. The information was
proffered by the target.
This account is incomplete since expectations of privacy depend in
part on background legal principles. If it is illegal to record an image
of the pudendum of an individual who appears unclothed in public,
perhaps nude public appearances should not constitute a voluntary
227
waiver of the expectation of shelter from recording. The adoption of
a legal prohibition on image capture, therefore, could be argued to establish the expectation of privacy that justifies its enforcement.

Florida Star is premised on the proposition that the information in question was
“lawfully acquired.” Id. at 535. Once information has been released into the public
sphere, however, a prohibition of recording cannot make it “unlawfully acquired.” Statutory prohibition of recording cannot define lawfulness of acquisition. Otherwise a
law that simply says “close your eyes” could justify suppression of anything seen.
226
E.g., Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 476-77 (discussing exceptions to the
“right of action for invasion of privacy”). In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)
(plurality opinion), the Court made a similar point.
Concededly a police agent who conceals his police connections may write
down for official use his conversations with a defendant and testify concerning
them, without a warrant authorizing his encounters . . . . For constitutional
purposes, no different result is required if the agent instead of immediately
reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant, either (1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his
person; (2) or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the
conversations . . . .
Id. at 751 (citations omitted).
227
Cf. Deibler v. State, 776 A.2d 657 (Md. 2001).
We are all familiar with the legend of Lady Godiva who, in response to a
commitment by her husband, Leofric, Earl of Mercia, to repeal onerous taxes
levied on the people of Coventry if she dared to ride naked through the town,
supposedly did so. Part of that legend, added some 600 years after the event,
was that one person in the town, a tailor named Tom, had the temerity to
glance upon the noblewoman as she proceeded on her mission and was immediately struck either blind or dead. This probably-mythical tailor became
known to history as Peeping Tom.
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The waiver account gains force, however, when we notice that protection of privacy is linked to the protection of dignity. When information is wrested from private control, the dignity of the subject is uniquely affronted: she and only she has been denied the right to be let
alone accorded to her fellows. She has been subjected to a disadvantage which uniquely lowers her in the social order. If the affront is
“outrageous,” as extant tort doctrine requires, recording of information may in turn be held to impinge on “interests of the highest or228
But when the subject releases information into an unconder.”
trolled environment, the question of dignity looks quite different. If
everyone on the street is regularly subject to having their foibles recorded, the capture of an image of me picking my nose in public may
embarrass me, but it does not deny my equal dignity. Social practice
rather than law establishes the relevant baseline of equal dignity. The
right to privacy does not encompass a dignity interest sufficient to
prohibit recording the public face that every member of society dis229
closes to others.
Indeed, once information is released, it becomes an element of
the lives of those who observe it as well as part of the lives of those who
produce it. The experience of viewing the arrest of my neighbor, or
of seeing her wear an embarrassing party hat while strolling in public,
is an element of my lived reality; likewise, the experience of hearing
Id. at 658.
228
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001); see also supra note 212 and accompanying text (describing how each of the opinions in Bartnicki used this concept).
229
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 534 (“‘Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees
is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and
of press.’” (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967))); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) (“The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that
in our pluralistic society . . . ‘we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes.’
Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensibilities.” (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970))); cf. United
States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“Where the designed
benefit of a content-based speech restriction is to shield the sensibilities of listeners,
the general rule is that the right of expression prevails . . . .”).
In Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000), the Court accorded constitutional stature
to the unwilling listener’s “right to be let alone” in upholding a prohibition of “counselors” who approach within eight feet of patients outside of medical facilities. Hill, 530
U.S. at 707-08, 710, 716-17 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the interest
recognized involved avoiding personal confrontation, “persistence, importunity, following and dogging,” id. at 717 (quoting Am. Steel Foundaries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades
Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204 (1921)) (internal quotation marks omitted), rather than a
right to “privacy” in public.
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her berate me or lie to me is as much my own as it is hers. A legal
regime which gives my neighbor the right to preclude recording those
experiences impinges on my control of my own recollections. Exposure of information to the public gaze provides public viewers a legi231
timate stake in the information that was absent before the exposure.
Once information is released into the public sphere, moreover, it
becomes a part of the stock of experience from which public dis232
course and common culture are constructed.
In the field of intellectual property, constitutional challenges attend legal innovations
233
that contract the sphere of publicly available information.
It is fair
230

Cf. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990) (explaining that a witness
could lawfully “divulge information of which he was in possession before he testified
before the grand jury”); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) (“Those who see
and hear what transpired [in court] can report it with impunity.”); Stilp v. Contino,
613 F.3d 405, 406, 408 (3d Cir. 2010) (enjoining the state from imposing civil or criminal sanctions against a citizen who disclosed that he filed an ethics complaint against a
public official); Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1211-12 (11th Cir. 2005) (declaring a
state statute that prohibits disclosure of information obtained during a government
investigation an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech); Kamasinski v. Judicial
Review Council, 44 F.3d 106, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that citizens may reveal
their own speculations about judicial misconduct, but not the fact that a complaint was
filed); First Amendment Coal. v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 479 (3d
Cir. 1986) (clarifying that witnesses may not disclose contents of proceedings before a
judicial review board, with the exception of their own testimony).
231
Cf. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895
P.2d 1269, 1281-82 (Nev. 1995) (“By observing Berosini through the eye of his video
camera . . . Gesmundo’s purpose was not to eavesdrop or to invade into a realm that
Berosini claimed for personal seclusion. Gesmundo was merely memorializing on tape
what he and others could readily perceive.”); Tarus v. Borough of Pine Hill, 916 A.2d
1036, 1045 (N.J. 2007) (“Today, hand-held video cameras are everywhere—attached to
our computers . . . and even built into recent generations of mobile telephones. The
broad and pervasive use of video cameras at public events evidences a societal acceptance of their use in public fora.”).
232
Cf. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918) (“[T]he information respecting current events contained in the literary production—is not the
creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the
history of the day.”), quoted with approval in Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991).
The Court has, however, acknowledged some authority to limit commercial exploitation of otherwise available information. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977); Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 241.
233
See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced, L.P., 505
F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he information used in CBC’s fantasy baseball
games is all readily available in the public domain, and it would be strange law that a
person would not have a [F]irst [A]mendment right to use information that is available to everyone.”); cf. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that First Amendment interests were overcome by substantial international copyright concerns); Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[O]nce the
works at issue became free for anyone to copy, plaintiffs in this case had vested First
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use to copy an image as part of the creation of new transformative
works of authorship, and an effort to dilute that protection meets con234
So, too, a legal doctrine which seeks to supstitutional objections.
press the recording of images of public action raises First Amendment
concerns that do not infect a doctrine that prevents others from seizing or compelling initial disclosures.
A doctrine punishing capture of public images would vest in the
plaintiff or prosecutor the right to truncate recollection and discussion of matters experienced by the community, and to effectively edit
the community’s memory. Given the emergence of pervasive image
capture, such a doctrine is unlikely to broadly inhibit the practice of
recording public occurrences for most Americans. Lior Strahilevitz
notes that the impact—if impact there is—of the original privacy tort
is most likely on “legally sophisticated parties,” like media defen235
dants. As a broad array of Americans begin as a matter of course to
pervasively document their lives with image capture, most subjects of
prohibition are not sophisticated legal actors. They are unlikely to be

Amendment interests in the expressions . . . .”); FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
915 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1990) (“ABC is free to retain copies of any of FMC’s documents in its possession . . . in the name of the First Amendment.”).
234
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-21 (2003) (explaining that fair
use is part of the “traditional contours of copyright protection” necessary to harmonize
the copyright regime with the First Amendment); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253
(2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the reproduction of a photographic image by a painter to
comment on its meaning was “transformative,” satisfying the requirement for fair use);
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the use of
thumbnail reproductions by a search engine to provide search capability was fair use);
L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 942 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding fair use
of a video clip used in an opening montage); Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235
F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (determining that “transformation” of modeling photos “into news . . . weigh[ed] in favor of fair use”).
Similar defenses apply to other intellectual property claims regarding use of images.
See, e.g., United States v. Martignon, 492 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2007) (remanding for
analysis of a First Amendment challenge to a federal statute prohibiting nonconsensual
recording of live musical performances); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915,
938 (6th Cir. 2003) (allowing a First Amendment defense to a federal trademark action
for an artistic lithograph of plaintiff’s picture); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255
F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a magazine was entitled to a First
Amendment defense against an action seeking damages for alteration of the plaintiff’s
image); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 962 (10th
Cir. 1996) (allowing a First Amendment defense to a federal trademark action and right
of publicity action for parody baseball cards using caricatures of plaintiffs).
235
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 919, 926 (2005) (“It is through the regulation of these legally sophisticated parties that tort law may have a strong, albeit indirect, effect on ordinary people’s expectations of privacy.”).
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informed of their potential liability, and the effect in establishing a
norm protecting against allegedly problematic image capture is likely
to be small. But punishments of image capture are well adapted to selective enforcement against political outsiders and those who annoy
subjects with sufficient resources to mount litigation. The editing of
collective discursive resources that results from aggressive legal innovations is thus likely to be of a sort particularly uncongenial to the
236
flourishing of “wide-open” and “robust” public discussion.
C. Image Capture in Nonpublic Venues
1. Participant Recording and Single Party Consent
Matters become more complicated when legal doctrines address
participants in smaller circles of interaction. When I seek covertly to
capture the images of my conversation with an acquaintance, or an investigator seeks to capture images of a target suspected of illicit activities in private, the claims of the subject of image capture are stronger.
The subject has done nothing to reveal herself to the public gaze, and
the capture and dissemination of her image singles her out for an impingement on her privacy and dignity. Moreover, by entering into private dialogue with their interlocutors, or entering demonstrably private
property, potential recorders strengthen the argument that they them237
selves have waived their First Amendment rights to capture images.
236

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); cf. L.A. Police Dep’t v.
United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 42 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring) (leaving
open the question of whether a policy “that allows access to the press . . . but at the same
time denies access to persons who wish to use the information for certain speech purposes, is in reality a restriction upon speech rather than upon access to government information”); id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[O]nce a State decides to make such a benefit available to the public, there are no doubt limits to its freedom to decide how that
benefit will be distributed. California could not, for example, release address information only to those whose political views were in line with the party in power.”); id. at 45-46
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing for appropriateness of constitutional challenge “when
the State makes information generally available, but denies access to a small disfavored
class . . . because the State’s discrimination is based on its desire to prevent the information from being used for constitutionally protected purposes”); Legi-Tech, Inc. v. Keiper,
766 F.2d 728, 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that the state violated the First Amendment if it permitted the public to access a state-maintained database of pending legislation, but refused access to “‘those entities which offer for sale the services of an electronic
information retrieval system which contains data relating to the proceedings of the legislature’” (quoting 1984 N.Y. Laws c.257, § 21(c), at 1821)).
237
This is the argument of Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate
Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887,
916-17 (2006), and Neil M. Richards and Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Reco-
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The interest in assuring that our private words and images are not
conveyed against our will to a public audience is constitutionally cog238
And in some situations, that interest is sufficient to justify
nizable.
prohibition of image capture. The constitutional magnitude of that
interest, however, is constrained in three dimensions.
First, we must distinguish between the capture and the distribution of images. The interest in avoiding outside observation depends
primarily on the distribution of captured images. An invited observer
who records images of her own interactions for her own future review
has not subjected private occurrences to unconsented public examination. Recording the image preserves memories of the observer’s
own life, and in most situations it is implausible—and of dubious con239
stitutionality—to imply an agreement to forgo her own memory. It
is only when and if the images are transmitted to others to whom the
subject has forbidden distribution that cognizable invasions of privacy
occur. A prohibition on image capture is an indirect means of avoiding this contingent harm. Since image capture is protected by the
First Amendment, justifying its prohibition as a means of preventing
certain sorts of subsequent dissemination runs afoul of First Amendment doctrine’s established hostility toward suppressing expression in
order to interdict future harms that may be prosecuted directly. As
the Court recently reiterated, “‘[t]he normal method of deterring unvering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 177-80 (2007). See also United States
v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 606 (1995) (“As to one who voluntarily assumed a duty of
confidentiality, governmental restrictions on disclosure are not subject to the same
stringent standards . . . .” (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 & n.3
(1980) (per curiam))); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1984)
(finding no First Amendment right to disseminate matters obtained in discovery); cf.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671-72 (1991) (enforcing a promise to
hold information confidential).
238
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (“[T]he disclosure of the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the
interception itself.”); cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547, 549 (1965) (holding that the
presence of television cameras in a courtroom denies due process because “[t]he impact upon a witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is
simply incalculable” and because courtroom television subjects the defendant to a
“form of mental—if not physical—harassment”), limited as to due process holding by
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 581 (1981).
239
Matters would differ, of course, if the information were initially obtained without direct and invited observation—as by wiretapping or technologically enhanced
surveillance. Video voyeurism statutes that target nonconsensual image capture in
places and circumstances in which the victim has “a reasonable expectation of privacy”
are consistent with this concern. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-605 (Supp. 2001)
(making it “an offense for a person to knowingly photograph . . . an individual, when
such individual is in a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
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lawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person
240
who engages in it.’”
Second, with respect to participant image capture in limitedaudience situations, most courts enforcing common law privacy constraints acknowledge that it is only “offensive” intrusion into private
matters that warrants sanction. Particularly salient public concern for
the information at issue may provide a First Amendment basis for limiting relief. These concerns are often incorporated into the “offensive241
ness” element of tort actions for “intrusion on seclusion” and the
“newsworthiness” defense in actions for dissemination of private
242
facts. To the extent that targeted statutes or new torts barring image
capture fail to incorporate such elements, they do not comport with
243
constitutional requirements.
Third, the Court itself has concluded that distribution of recorded
first-person observations does not impinge on the subject’s legitimate
244
expectations of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes. This conclusion does not itself determine the weight of such expectations in
First Amendment analysis, and some states have recognized legitimate

240

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (quoting Bartnicki, 532
U.S. at 529); see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (invalidating a statute
punishing distributors of leaflets as a way of discouraging littering by recipients).
241
See, e.g., Sanders v. ABC, Inc., 978 P.2d 67, 77 (Cal. 1999) (finding that defendants in the media may “negate the offensiveness element” by showing that their intrusion was for purposes of news-gathering); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d
469, 493 (Cal. 1998) (arguing that given the public interest in news, some intrusion
that might “otherwise be considered offensive” may be justified); cf. Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1079-80 (Cal. 2009) (considering justification and “offensiveness” for video surveillance). Video voyeurism statutes that incorporate an element
of lewd intent also respond to this concern.
242
See, e.g., Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1216-17, 1220-22 (10th Cir.
2007) (refusing to find that the tort of public disclosure of private facts precluded the
release of police officers’ identity in connection with sexual assault allegations).
243
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Court found recovery for publication of images consistent with First Amendment constraints where
petitioner’s state-law right of publicity would not serve to prevent respondent
from reporting the newsworthy facts about petitioners act . . . [and] neither
the public nor respondent will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner’s performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized. Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance;
he simply wants to be paid for it.
Id. at 574, 578.
244
See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (plurality opinion); see also,
e.g., United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603-04 (9th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between video images captured while informants are in the room and those captured in
apparent privacy and citing relevant cases).
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expectations of nonrecording and nondistribution of images observed
245
as a matter of state privacy law. But to the extent that states do not
recognize such expectations as legitimate and instead continue to allow law enforcement officials and government informers to record
and distribute their observations without constraint, it becomes more
difficult for such states to claim that immunity to private image cap246
ture is an interest “of the highest order.”
2. Consensual First-Party Image Capture and “Sexting”
Recording one’s own image usually risks no legal liability. However, as digital image capture capabilities encounter teenage hormones
and impulsiveness in an increasingly sexualized environment, those
technologies have unsurprisingly been turned to the service of teenaged sexual transgression. Surveys indicate that the practice of “sexting” sexually provocative self-images captured on cell phones or digital cameras to friends and romantic partners is widespread among
247
teenagers.
Prosecutors scandalized by graphic records of teen sexual liaisons have begun to deploy statutes prohibiting the production
of child pornography and obscenity against teenagers who memorialize their sexual interactions with photographic images or who capture
248
sexualized self-portraits and convey them to friends.

245

See 2 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES § 11.04(6) (4th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2010) (identifying
states rejecting the Court’s holding in White); THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A
TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES § 11.4(a) (Gormley et al. eds., 2004) (“[T]he
Pennsylvania Courts have given the reasonable expectation of privacy concept
a . . . robust interpretation.”); Melanie L. Black-Dubis, The Consensual Electronic Surveillance Experiment: State Courts React to United States v. White, 47 VAND. L. REV. 857, 86573 (1994) (discussing states that have provided constitutional protection against participant recording).
246
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
247
See supra note 7 (surveying statistics on the transmission of sexually explicit
images by teens).
248
See supra notes 8, 70, 71. For a thoughtful recent investigation of the First
Amendment issues with respect to minors, see John A. Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First
Amendment, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 433 (2010). See also Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones,
Privacy, and the First Amendment: When Children Become Child Pornographers and the Lolita
Effect Undermines the Law, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1 (2009).
So too, recordkeeping regulations designed to suppress child pornography, which
might apply to limit sexting between adults, raise First Amendment concerns. See Free
Speech Coal. v. Holder, No. 09-4607, 2010 WL 2982985, at *38-41 (E.D. Pa. July 27,
2010) (declining to address application of federal recordkeeping statutes 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2257 & 2257A to adult sexting because the federal government disavowed intent to
prosecute private and noncommercial expression).
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“Sexting” usually manifests deplorable judgment on the part of
the teenager involved. The volatility of digital images raises the risk of
potential embarrassment—and indeed trauma—if recipients retransmit images. But child pornography prosecutions against teenagers
who take or send sexualized pictures of themselves raise substantial
First Amendment questions.
In its initial determination that, unlike obscenity, production and
possession of “child pornography” can be prosecuted without reference to the images’ potentially redeeming value, the Court observed
that “laws directed at the dissemination of child pornography run the
risk of suppressing protected expression by allowing the hand of the
249
In Osborne v. Ohio, the Court accensor to become unduly heavy.”
knowledged that it was the special harms of the sexual abuse of children that justified the exception to First Amendment protections. If “a
parent gave a family friend a picture of the parent’s infant taken while
the infant was unclothed,” prosecution of either the parent or the re250
cipient would “criminalize[] constitutionally protected conduct.”
In contrast to images obtained by subjecting a child to sexual abuse,
teenage sexting—at least where there is no statutory prohibition against
the underlying conduct recorded—like the computer-generated images
protected in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, “records no crime and
251
creates no victims by its production.”
Personal communication between actual or prospective romantic partners can claim protection un252
Notwithstanding the reactions of scandader the First Amendment.
lized prosecutors, teenagers who email or text a nude picture of
themselves to a boyfriend or a girlfriend should be treated no differently for purposes of the First Amendment than teenagers a generation
249

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
495 U.S. 103, 113 n.9 (1990); see id. at 115 n.11 (“We do not concede . . . that
the statute as construed might proscribe a family friend’s possession of an innocuous
picture of an unclothed infant.”).
251
535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002); see id. at 249 (stating that the “child pornography”
exception to First Amendment doctrine rests on the proposition that the material in
question is “the product of child sexual abuse”).
252
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (noting the importance of
private conversations); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974) (finding the
private correspondence between a prison inmate and his wife protected by the First
Amendment), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401; Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264, 264-65 (1966) (per curiam) (granting the Solicitor General’s motion to vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss obscenity prosecution of a husband and wife who mailed “undeveloped films of each other posing in
the nude to an out-of-state firm for developing”); cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,
486 (1965) (holding that there must be heightened protection against searches of private correspondence and literary materials under a general warrant).
250
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ago who handed a lover a nude self portrait in charcoal or oil paint, or
a Polaroid photo.
There is, to be sure, much more to be said to fully analyze the
problem of sexting. Further dissemination of images by recipients, for
example, may raise different issues, both because the subjects have not
consented to the distribution, and because potential harms rise exponentially as material disperses over the Internet. A teenager who engages in commercial distribution of his or her sexualized image can
legitimately be subject to strictures against commercialized pandering
that would apply to his adult counterpart. And where images capture
activities prohibited under statutory rape laws, further concerns would
arise. But such justifications must meet the threshold for regulation
of expression: sexting, like other forms of image capture and distribution, cannot be treated as conduct invisible to the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Justice Kennedy’s recent majority opinion in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission observed that “television networks and major newspapers owned by media corporations,” which have become our society’s
“most salient media,” are a form unimagined by the Framers of the First
253
But, he continued, “that does not mean that those
Amendment.
speakers and media are entitled to less First Amendment protection
than those types of speakers and media that provided the means of
254
communicating political ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted.”
With the diffusion of digital image technology in the last decade,
pervasive image capture and sharing has become an increasingly “salient” medium of expression both in public and in private. In public,
pervasive image capture grants authority to a range of unofficial voices;
it provides a means of holding the conduct of the powerful to account.
Pervasive image capture provides important elements of public discourse both in the “networks and major newspapers owned by media
corporations,” and in the listservs, blogs, and social networking websites that Justice Kennedy’s opinion identified as the dynamic succes255
sors of currently established media. In private, it lays the basis of interpersonal connection in a centrifugal age. Image capture memorializes personal experience and enables us to remember and reflect
upon our lives. As culture critic Susan Sontag has observed, “In an era
253
254
255

130 S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010).
Id.
Id. at 913.
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of information overload, the photograph provides a quick way of ap256
prehending something and a compact form for memorizing it.”
When we recognize these propositions, it follows that the First
Amendment protects the right to record images we observe as part of
the right to form, reflect upon, and share our memories.

256

SUSAN SONTAG, REGARDING THE PAIN OF OTHERS 22 (2003).

